Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Protection Recommendations

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MANDIANT PROPRIETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL
# Change Log

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version / Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0: February 18, 2022</td>
<td>Initial Document</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents

DDoS Protection Recommendations.................................................................4
Background ........................................................................................................4
Protective Recommendations...........................................................................4
  Vendor Partnerships for DDoS Protections............................................................5
  Cloud Service Provider DDoS and WAF Protections ...........................................5
  Additional Technical Controls and Protections....................................................6
DDoS Protection Recommendations

Background

A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) event is a targeted attempt to disrupt normalized traffic of an application, service, or dependent infrastructure by overwhelming the target network with a flood of Internet-based traffic. The goal of this event is to exhaust the target’s resources, effectively rendering the target unavailable for legitimate access methods.

DDoS events are especially impactful as they commonly utilize multiple concurrent infrastructure points as sources of the malicious traffic. Without pre-established vendor partnerships and preparation, attempting to block specific IP addresses or subnets is typically ineffective in combating targeted DDoS events.

Different types of DDoS events include:

- Application (Layer 7) events - targeting a specific application or service to exhaust resources (e.g., HTTP/SMTP Flood).
- Protocol (Layer 3 and 4) events - leveraging Layer 3 (IP, ICMP) or Layer 4 (UDP, TCP) protocol behaviors to consume target device capacity (e.g., SYN Flood).
- Volumetric / Amplification events - generating a large scope of traffic to saturate the target’s bandwidth (e.g., UDP Flooding, DNS amplification).

Protective Recommendations

Most DDoS protections come in the form of either:

- An “always-on” vendor solution.
- On-premises or SaaS-based appliance solutions.
- Configurations that organizations can manually invoke in the event of a DDoS event.
- Content Distribution Network (CDN) infrastructure that can front a web or API presence.

Before integrating a DDoS protection and mitigation strategy, the following items should be considered:

- What specific (external-facing) applications or services could be impacted by a DDoS event?
- What specific types of connectivity methods need to be protected (e.g., standard web traffic, communications protocols, API traffic)?
- What components of external-facing applications or services could be impacted - that align to protective controls that should be considered (e.g., API throttling, rate limiting, DNS protections, credential stuffing protections)?
- Is an “always on” solution necessary or can an organization leverage specific configurations that can be rapidly enabled should a DDoS event occur?
- How will testing and verification of potential latency impacts of an “always on” solution be accomplished?
- What SLAs does the organization require from their DDoS vendor?
- Does the DDoS mitigation solution require IP reputation or threat-based intel integration?
- Does the DDoS mitigation solution need to include DNS (inbound or outbound) protections?

Additional best-practices when considering DDoS protective and mitigating controls:

- DDoS mitigation is often very complicated, so partnering with a trusted and validated service provider for DDoS protections and configurations is recommended.
- Keep the architecture as simple as possible.
• Many internet service providers (ISPs) offer DDoS protection. This approach may be insufficient if an organization uses multiple ISPs (across multiple datacenters) — as services would need to be integrated from all supporting ISPs, adding to the overall design and complexity.

• Understand the physical locations, capacity, and capabilities of a prospective DDoS protection provider.

• Ensure that both Information Security and Information Technology teams are aware of how the solution(s) are implemented and have well-documented processes for enabling the controls should they be necessary.

• Ensure that Information Security and Information Technology teams have full visibility to the availability and performance of the DDoS solution(s).

• To provide visibility to understand where DDoS (and even non-DDoS) events originate, ensure that the implemented solution(s) support and enable X-Forwarded-For (XFF) headers.

• Document the processes and technical requirements needed to on-board with a provider in the event of a DDoS event. Onboarding may require sufficient preparation time and dependent tasks, such as reducing the Time To Live (TTL) for DNS configurations.

• Regularly test the ability to onboard to an on-demand DDoS protection provider.

Vendor Partnerships for DDoS Protections

Partnering with vendors that specialize in DDoS protections and configurations is ideal when aligning a protection strategy. The list below contains example vendors that can provide effective protections and mitigations for DDoS events.

• Akamai
• Cloudflare
• DataDome
• F5
• Fastly
• Imperva
• Neustar
• NetScout
• Nexusguard
• Rackspace
• Radware

Cloud Service Provider DDoS and WAF Protections

Cloud service providers can offer DDoS protections and web application firewall services (WAFs) for resources hosted within their infrastructure or platform as a service model. DDoS protections within a cloud tenant may require additional cost and/or licensing and are generally not enabled by default. If a third-party vendor solution is not already utilized, organizations that leverage cloud-based infrastructure for hosting applications and services should review DDoS and WAF protection options that are available from their cloud service provider.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cloud Service Provider</th>
<th>Protection Offerings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft Azure</td>
<td>Azure DDoS Protection Standard</td>
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<td>Azure Web Application Firewall</td>
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<td>Amazon Web Services (AWS)</td>
<td>AWS Shield</td>
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<td>AWS WAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Google Cloud Platform (GCP)</td>
<td>Google Cloud Armor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI)</td>
<td>Layer 7 DDoS Mitigation</td>
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Additional Technical Controls and Protections

If an impacted organization hasn’t previously integrated either a third-party or cloud service provider’s DDoS protections, depending on the type of DDoS event, specific configuration-based countermeasures may be viable short-term solutions.

Blackhole Routing

DDoS blackhole routing (filtering) can be used to route network traffic to a null-route location (“sinkhole”) using an edge router or networking device. With this configuration, both legitimate and malicious network traffic can be prevented from reaching a target. Sophisticated DDoS events that use variable IP addresses can limit the effectiveness of this type of countermeasure – as an organization would essentially need to sinkhole ALL traffic destined for a target resource – thus impacting the availability of a target for legitimate access purposes.

Internet service providers (ISPs) can also perform this type of countermeasure for clients by simply injecting a null route to block all DDoS traffic relative to a specific target - with the hopes of reducing the impact for their customers who are experiencing collateral impact because of the event.

ISPs commonly leverage either a remotely triggered black hole (RTBH) or BGP Flowspec for DDoS mitigations. Using RTBH, the ISP routers are commonly pre-staged with a "special next hop" to null0 (blackhole) pre-defined. As soon as DDoS traffic is identified, the ISP injects a new route pointing to the blackhole, and ALL traffic will be dropped. This protects the destination network but removes the ability to reach the specific customer netblocks. In addition to the destination-based model, RTBH can also be configured in a source-based model when origination IPs or netblocks associated with DDoS events are identified.

BGP Flowspec can provide more granularity for mitigating DDoS events. As soon as DDoS traffic patterns are identified, a specific route advertisement will be sent that contains flow criteria (source, destination, L4 parameters and packet specifics). The ISP routers will implement this new policy dynamically, and the specific DDoS flow will be dropped, while legitimate traffic that doesn’t match the malicious flow criteria is permitted to reach customer environments.

BGP Peering Modifications

The border gateway protocol (BGP) is an internet routing protocol that advertises which autonomous systems (AS) (networks managed by a single enterprise or service provider) are authoritative and reachable from other networks. BGP is responsible for managing packet routing through the exchange of information amongst edge routers.

During a DDoS event, BGP routes can be configured to redirect and reroute traffic to a cloud-based DDoS mitigation vendor. To offload and handle the traffic, this method essentially requires manually changing the advertised network routes for the victim organization using BGP to that of the mitigation provider. Unlike an “always on” configuration (where BGP routes are always advertised for routing traffic to the mitigation provider first), this method relies upon manual configuration changes during a suspected DDoS event. This method requires that organizations already have an agreement in place with a mitigation vendor — and that BGP modification changes are staged, exercised, and ready to implement when required.

In many situations, organizations purchase “blended internet” from data center providers. “Blended internet” uses a combination of multiple upstream internet service providers (ISPs) and local internet exchanges to provide internet services. Organizations that leverage this type of service should be prepared to work with their provider to potentially remove individual providers from the “pool” of blended internet services. Often this can alleviate a DDoS event where all the traffic is originating from a single ISP.

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<th>Oracle Cloud WAF</th>
<th>Alibaba Cloud</th>
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<td>Anti-DDoS</td>
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<td>Web Application Firewall</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Cloud service provider DDoS and WAF example offerings
Rate Limiting

Many cloud service providers and DDoS protection vendors offer API Gateway services that allow for organizations to rate limit (throttle) API calls to services or applications. This is a potentially effective way to ensure application availability during a DDoS event.

To capture and correlate throughput data and metrics from web-hosted applications, logs provided by API gateways are also a very important collection point for Information Security teams. These metrics can potentially be leveraged to identify traffic patterns and trends which could be indicative of DDoS targeting.

Web Application Firewalls (WAFs)

While web application firewalls (WAFs) may not solely protect an organization from a DDoS event, they are often included as a mitigation component for filtering potentially malicious traffic at Layer 7 (application-layer). Common types of WAFs are noted below.

- A network-based WAF is generally hardware-based – and are installed locally within on-premises data centers, which can minimize latency. On-premises WAF capabilities are also common in application delivery controllers (ADCs).
- A host-based WAF can be fully integrated within application’s software – or running as a service on an endpoint.
- Cloud-based WAFs provide a scalable and flexible method to protect external-facing resources, requiring minimal overhead and resources. This service can be quickly integrated by configuring DNS for a target application to reference the cloud-based WAF. Cloud-based WAFs can also integrate timely updates and protections based upon the newest threats and attacker techniques.

WAFs can be operated in two distinct modes, enforcement mode or monitoring-only mode. In enforcement mode, WAFs can potentially stop common application-focused attacks such as SQL injection (SQLi) and cross site scripting (XSS).

In either configuration, it’s critical that Information Security teams have access to the logs produced by WAF solutions - as these can provide high-fidelity detections of malicious activity.

Anycast Network Diffusion

Anycast network diffusion functions like a load balancer or application delivery controller. Instead of routing traffic to a single network location, with an anycast architecture, traffic is widely distributed across multiple destinations such as cloud regions, or data centers that share a common IP address. This distribution can help prevent a singular network location from being overwhelmed with requests during a DDoS event.

In most configurations, the applications or services hosted behind the anycast network will need to be stateless. Content delivery networks (CDNs) are often aligned with this configuration.

DNS Protections

Domain Naming Service (DNS) is one of the most important and fundamental services used by all organizations. In situations where organizations host their own DNS resolvers, attackers will often attempt to overwhelm those systems and prevent legitimate DNS requests from being successful. This attack is often referred to as a “DNS flood attack”.

DNS amplification attacks are different from DNS flood attacks. DNS amplification is a form of DDoS attack which an attacker initiates a DNS look-up query with a spoofed target IP, making the spoofed target the recipient of amplified DNS responses. Using this method, the attacker’s goal is to saturate the target network with DNS responses - exhausting bandwidth capacity.

Organizations that still leverage on-premises DNS resolvers for advertising their external services should consider hosting their DNS with third-party providers that have inherent protections available as part of the DNS hosting services. If a third-party DNS hosting provider is selected, organizations need to ensure that access controls are enforced so that any DNS record modifications require multi-factor authentication and access is only from pre-
DDOS PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS

established IP subnets. Threat actors will often attempt to modify DNS records for organizations to further impact the availability and disruption of services.

Credential Stuffing and Password Spraying Protections

Credential stuffing and password spraying represent automated methods leveraged by attackers to effectively authenticate to an external-facing application or service using valid credentials. These attacks are commonly used to access SaaS based platforms, as well as external-facing on-premises applications that don’t enforce lock-out protections. Vendors that provide DDoS mitigation services commonly also provide services that can help detect and stop these attacks.

Additional controls that can be leveraged to prevent against access using these methods include:

- Enforcing a strong password policy – in addition to multi-factor authentication, security questions, or additional verification methods for authentication purposes.
- Enforcing account lock-out settings when subsequent authentication failures occur within a pre-defined timeframe.
- Implementing web controls such as CAPTCHA or RECAPTCHA to help protect against automated logon attempts.
- Implementing identity protection services that can identify potentially weak passwords or previously leaked credentials (e.g., Azure Identity Protection).
- Enforcing adaptive authentication – which integrates additional telemetry (geolocation, source IP address blocks, risk-based conditions) as part of the authentication process.

IP Reputation Services

Most vendors in the DDoS mitigation space integrate threat intelligence related to suspicious IP addresses or network blocks. This integration can be leveraged to proactively protect organizations by blocking traffic from IPs or network blocks that are correlated to initiating DDoS or credential stuffing attacks, providing anonymous or proxy connections (e.g., TOR exit nodes) or providing anonymous VPN exit nodes.

Organizations that are partnering with DDoS mitigation providers should verify if the vendor includes automated integration of threat intelligence and indicators as part of the overall service offering.