

REPORT

APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION



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Executive Summary

FireEye Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that APT41 is a Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that is also conducting financially motivated activity for personal gain.

APT41 espionage operations against the healthcare, high-tech, and telecommunications sectors include establishing and maintaining strategic access, and through mid-2015, the theft of intellectual property.

The group's operations against higher education, travel services, and news/media firms provide some indication that the group also tracks individuals and conducts surveillance.

FireEye Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that APT41 carries out an array of financially motivated intrusions, particularly against the video game industry, including stealing source code and digital certificates, virtual currency manipulation, and attempting to deploy ransomware.

APT41 has executed multiple software supply chain compromises, gaining access to software companies to inject malicious code into legitimate files before distributing updates.



Overview

FireEye Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that APT41 is a prolific cyber threat group that carries out Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity in addition to financially motivated activity potentially outside of state control. Activity traces back to 2012 when individual members of APT41 conducted primarily financially motivated operations focused on the video game industry before expanding into likely state-sponsored activity. This is remarkable because explicit financially motivated targeting is unusual among Chinese state-sponsored threat groups, and evidence suggests these two motivations were balanced concurrently from 2014 onward.

- APT41 is unique among tracked China-based actors in that it leverages non-public malware typically reserved for espionage operations in what appears to be activity that falls outside the scope of state-sponsored missions.
- Based on early observed activity, consistent behavior, and APT41's unusual focus on the video game industry, we believe the group's cyber crime activities are most likely motivated by personal financial gain or hobbyist interests.

This contrasts with the state-sponsored goals that likely drive the group's healthcare, high-tech, and politically related targeting.

- We believe that APT41 is highly sophisticated and innovative. Its history of financially motivated targeting of the video game industry has ultimately supported the group's state-sponsored activity.
- The group's distinct use of supply chain compromises to target select individuals, consistent use of compromised digital certificates, and deployment of bootkits (rare among APT operators), highlight a creative and well-resourced adversary.
- Some of the early operations driven by personal gain used techniques that would later be pivotal in executing supply chain compromises.
- Learning to access video game production environments enabled APT41 to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that were later leveraged against software companies to inject malicious code into software updates.

APT41 campaigns include most of the incidents previously attributed in FireEye Threat Intelligence reporting to GREF Team and a number of additional clusters that were previously unnamed.

Targeting

Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 targets industries in a manner generally aligned with China's Five-Year economic development plans. However, some campaigns attributed to APT41 indicate that the group is also deployed to gather intelligence ahead of imminent events, such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and political events.

Directly targeted verticals include:

- Healthcare: including medical devices and diagnostics
- High-tech: including semiconductors, advanced computer hardware, battery technology, and electric vehicles
- Media: including news organizations
- Pharmaceuticals
- Retail
- Software companies: which were compromised in supply chain operations potentially affecting large numbers of victims
- Telecoms
- Travel services
- Education
- Video games: including development studios, distributors/publishers, and activities enabling supply chain compromises
- Virtual currencies: including in-game currencies, cryptocurrencies, and related services

APT41 has targeted organizations in 14 countries (and Hong Kong) over seven years, including: France, India, Italy, Japan, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Figure 1). APT41 espionage operations against entities in these countries follow targeting of verticals consistent with Chinese national policy priorities.

TARGETED IN 14 COUNTRIES




FIGURE 1. Countries and industries targeted directly by APT41.

Industries Targeted		
 Automotive	 Financial	 Pharmaceuticals
 Business Services	 Healthcare	 Retail
 Cryptocurrency	 High-Tech	 Telecommunications
 Education	 Intergovernmental	 Travel
 Energy	 Media and Entertainment	


Operations Over Time

The duality of APT41's state-sponsored activity and its own cyber crime operations is demonstrated in the group's simultaneous operations. Throughout the group's observable history, APT41 has consistently run its own financially motivated campaigns concurrently with espionage operations. In contrast, APT41 espionage targeting has changed significantly over time, suggesting shifts in assigned missions or new contracts to complete. A breakdown of industries targeted by APT41 over time can be found in Figure 2.

- We believe that like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 has moved toward strategic intelligence collection and establishing access, but away from direct intellectual property theft. This shift, however, has not affected the group's consistent interest in targeting the video game industry for financially motivated reasons.
 - We have not observed evidence of IP theft since late 2015.
 - In 2014, APT41 was observed carrying out espionage campaigns concurrently with financially motivated intrusions, demonstrating that they could balance different objectives simultaneously.
- Espionage operations occurred while the group was still carrying out financially motivated campaigns, including longer-term intrusions, which typically extended for more than a year.
 - In one instance, APT41 was attempting to steal data from a healthcare target while also attempting to deploy ransomware at a video game studio.
- Compromising organizations in different sectors concurrently provides some indication that they are fulfilling specific assigned tasks.
 - Campaigns have expanded into additional industries including telecoms, the automotive sector, higher education, and travel services.
 - In 2015, we observed a time period in which eight organizations in six different industries were compromised simultaneously.
- Since 2017, APT41's activities have included a series of supply chain compromises. The operation injects malware into legitimate server software packages used by hundreds of companies worldwide but limits deployment of additional payloads to select targets.

FIGURE 2. Timeline of industries targeted by APT41.

INDUSTRIES TARGETED BY APT 41



Cyber Espionage Activity

Observed APT41 targeting is consistent with China's national strategies to move production capabilities upmarket into research and development (R&D)-heavy fields. These initiatives were especially highlighted with "Made in China 2025," a plan announced in 2015 that aims to shift China's economy toward higher value products and services, including pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and other high-tech industries.

- We assess that the targeting of high-tech firms that produce computer components aligns with Chinese interests in domestically developing high-end technologies as outlined in the **12th** (2011) and **13th** (2016) Five-Year plans, as well as the **Made in China 2025** (2015) initiative.
 - Since 2013, APT41 has targeted organizations involved in the research, development, and sale of computer components used for machine-learning, autonomous vehicles, medical imaging, and the consumer market. The group also targeted companies involved in producing motherboards, processors, and server solutions for enterprises.
 - In April 2013, the group targeted an enterprise cloud-computing provider. Developing domestic cloud-computing technologies was a goal in the 12th Five-Year Plan.
 - In a 2014 compromise, APT41 targeted a European conglomerate and specifically focused on systems physically located in China.
- The timing of multiple intrusions attributed to the group indicate a focused interest in strategic business decisions, including entry into the Chinese market, partnerships/M&A, and expansion into other regional markets.
 - In October 2017, an intrusion into a retailer targeted strategic investment plans at the same time as the firm was beginning to negotiate a partnership with a Chinese company (although this potential deal was not publicized).
 - In spring 2015, APT41 targeted information related to two entities undergoing a merger announced the previous year. This included data related to a senior executive, as well as payroll and communications integration issues.
- Since 2017, APT41 has consistently targeted telecommunications companies, possibly a crucial first step to establish a foothold in targeting a particular region.
 - Targeted telecom companies spanned several countries, and recently identified intrusions were concentrated in countries where we had not identified any prior APT41 activity.
 - APT41 has targeted large telecom companies and their subsidiaries in various locations, demonstrating consistent interest in obtaining access to these targets.
 - The group has also repeatedly targeted call record information at telecom companies, supporting indications of their wider intelligence collection efforts.

In addition to specifically targeting industries of strategic value, we suggest that APT41 is also given more tactical assignments, including reconnaissance and identifying dissidents.

- A hotel was targeted two weeks ahead of a diplomatic visit in which high-ranking Chinese officials stayed there. Personal data within the reservations system was directly accessed, suggesting the group was potentially tasked to reconnoiter the facility.
- We assess with moderate confidence that APT41 gathered intelligence on pro-democracy dissidents in Hong Kong based on the targets and timing of operations.

- In July and August 2016, APT41 sent spear-phishing emails to Hong Kong media organizations known for pro-democracy editorial content.
- The timing and targeting of this activity suggests possible interest in the pro-democracy Umbrella Movement candidates who were running for seats in Hong Kong's legislative council.
- A spear-phishing email with the subject-line "help" was later sent to one of the previously targeted organizations in October 2017, coinciding with the sentencing of pro-democracy Occupy activists. The ruling placed a five-year ban on the activists from holding public offices in Hong Kong.

- This was the first instance we have observed of APT41 targeting pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong.

APT41 frequently leverages timely news stories as the lure content in their spear-phishing emails, although social engineering content does not always correlate with targeted users or organizations.

- In 2015, APT41 targeted a Japanese media organization with a lure document (Figure 3) titled “中東呼吸器症候群(MERS)の予防,” which translates to “Prevention of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS).” The fear of respiratory infections and a potential pandemic provide particularly effective lure material against targets in the Asia-Pacific region that had first-hand experience with prior SARS and avian flu outbreaks.

FIGURE 3. MERS-themed lure document leveraging sexyjapan.ddns.info for C&C (MD5: 5e87b09f9a3f1b728c9797560a38764b).

【感染症】中東呼吸器症候群(MERS)の原因・症状・予防法

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CASE STUDY

Healthcare Sector Targeting

APT41 activity aimed at medical device companies and pharmaceuticals is demonstrative of the group's capacity to collect sensitive and highly valuable intellectual property (IP), although we have not observed evidence of IP theft since late 2015. The healthcare sector was targeted in a manner that is highly specific and most likely indicative of focused taskings from sponsoring organizations with a stake in the healthcare market. Targeted information included pharmaceutical development, clinical trial data, and intelligence regarding a medical subsidiary's parent company.





The targeting of these organizations just ahead of the release of products requiring a long R&D cycle can confer a significant market advantage to a competitor. The observed activities are indicative of ongoing efforts to support China's own R&D efforts in support of Made in China 2025.

- Between July 2014 and May 2016, APT41 targeted a medical devices subsidiary of a large corporation.
 - Although APT41 initially targeted the parent company, 30 percent of the victimized hosts were related to a subsidiary specialized in manufacturing medical devices. Password strings and spoofed domains leveraged in the operation signify a narrow tasking to target the subsidiary instead of the parent corporation.
 - We have some indication based on the nature of hosts targeted that APT41 was interested in information technology employees and software used by the medical device subsidiary.
 - A keylogger dubbed GEARSHIFT was first deployed at the medical device company. A digital certificate from the victim was compromised and used to sign malware used in an operation against a separate biotech company detailed below.
- A biotech company undergoing acquisition was targeted by APT41 in May 2015. Highly sensitive information about corporate operations, including human resources data, tax information, and acquisition-related documents, were targeted.
 - Clinical trials data of developed drugs, academic data, and R&D funding-related documents were exfiltrated.
 - The time frame, use of the same GEARSHIFT sample, and a digital certificate from the aforementioned medical device company provide some indication that these two campaigns were conducted by the same operator concurrently.
- In 2018, we observed APT41 target a third healthcare company, although their goals during this compromise were unclear.

Financially Motivated Activity

Unlike other observed Chinese espionage operators, APT41 conducts explicit financially motivated activity, which has included the use of tools that are otherwise exclusively used in campaigns supporting state interests. The late-night to early morning activity of APT41's financially motivated operations suggests that the group primarily conducts these activities outside of their normal day jobs. However, the group compiled malware for use in cyber crime activity even during espionage-focused working hours.

- As demonstrated in Figure 4, operational times for APT41 espionage operations over all observed activity are relatively close to Chinese work hours (in UTC +8, China's time zone).
- In contrast, the group's financially motivated activity targeting the video game industry tends to occur much later in the night.

Operational times at gaming targets are most frequent between 18:00 and 07:00(UTC +8), providing some indication that the group is moonlighting. Note that this is based on data collected over years and does not represent a daily schedule.

- The typical working hours in China for tech workers is a **"996" work schedule** (9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., six days a week), which is consistent with APT41's operational activity observed over time.
- Operational times at targets not related to video games (and therefore, almost certainly in support of state-sanctioned missions) are more frequent between 14:00 and 22:00 (China Standard Time (CST), UTC +8), closer to conventional working hours (Figure 4).
- Analysis of compile times for all portable executable (PE) files suggests that APT41's average working hours fall between 10:00 to 23:00 (UTC +8), highlighting that the financially motivated activity is most likely extraneous to their espionage operations.
- Compile times for samples used in suspected financial gain missions are skewed toward later in the evening, roughly 19:00 to 00:00 (UTC +8). However, there is significant overlap with the compile times of PE files deployed at espionage targets between 15:00 to 19:00 (UTC +8).

APT41 OPERATIONAL TIMES UTC +8




FIGURE 4. Operational activity for gaming versus non-gaming-related targeting based on observed operations since 2012.

The group has also targeted cryptocurrencies, including at least one case in which there was a connection between cryptocurrency and an online video gaming platform.

- In June 2018, APT41 sent spear-phishing emails using an invitation lure to join a decentralized gaming platform linked to a cryptocurrency service (Figure 5) that had positioned itself as a medium of exchange for online games and gambling sites. The malicious emails were sent from an email address listed with the name Tom Giardino, which is likely a reference to an employee

at Valve, an American video game developer responsible for the software distribution platform Steam and various video games. The body of the email (Figure 6) also mentions gaming offerings. This provides another connection between the targeting of the cryptocurrency organizations and video game targeting.

- In October 2018, the group compiled an instance of XMRig, a Monero cryptocurrency mining tool, demonstrating a continued interest in cryptocurrency.

● Tom Giardino 

项目 (FairWin) 上线申请!

To: 

项目介绍:

FairWin是一个分散的在线游戏平台，
确保赢得公平性，因为我们特别的FairChannel保证了准确的RTP费率。
该系统基于区块链，这意味着游戏过程是开放的。奖金的支付是自动的，
不依赖于组织者。除此之外，我们还提供有趣的大气游戏，带有迷人的图形，
可以在任何设备和任何浏览器上运行，这样所有玩家都可以享受这些体验。
其他详细内容请参见附件!



FairWin.chm.xz

FIGURE 5. Screenshot of invitation to join the FairWin online gaming platform.

From: Tom Giardino <hrsimon59@gmail.com>
Date: <redacted>
Subject: Project (FairWin) online application!

Project Introduction:
FairWin is a decentralized online gaming platform.

Be sure to win fairness because our special FairChannel guarantees accurate RTP rates.
The system is based on a blockchain, which means that the gameplay process is open. The
payment of the bonus is automatic. Not dependent on the organizer. In addition to this, we
also offer fun generous games with fascinating graphics. It can be run on any device and any
browser so that all players can enjoy these experiences.
Please refer to the attachment for other details!


FIGURE 6. English translation of invitation to join the FairWin online gaming platform.

CASE STUDY

Video Game Industry Targeting

APT41 continuously returns to targeting the video game sector and seems to have matured its campaigns through lessons learned in operations against the industry. We believe these operations include broadly malicious activity that can enable further operations, such as targeting game source code and compromising digital certificates, while other activities are explicitly financially motivated, such as abusing in-game currency mechanics. APT41 campaigns focused on the video game sector have largely affected studios and distributors in East and Southeast Asia, although global companies based in the United States have also been targeted.





The group leverages many TTPs during the targeting of video game-related organizations, which are likewise employed in their espionage operations.

- Since at least 2012, APT41 has repeatedly gained access to game development environments within affected companies, including online multiplayer networks, as well as targeting of production database administrators.
 - The group is competent in both Linux and Windows environments and can pivot easily between both environments within a single operation, including compromising intermediary servers that provide access to separated Windows and Linux environments.
 - In October 2012, APT41 used captured credentials to compromise a jump server and access a production environment where they deployed a Linux version of PHOT0. Based on the machines targeted, we have some indication that APT41 specifically sought to access production machines used in the development of an upcoming online game.
 - In 2014, APT41 used a variant of SOGU that is capable of connecting to Windows and Linux systems via SSH and Samba/CIFS.
 - APT41 has been observed inserting malicious code into legitimate video game files to distribute malware. In 2018, the group inserted CRACKSHOT malware into game files that were signed with legitimate code-signing certificates, most likely indicating access to the production environment, which facilitated a supply chain compromise.
 - A highly similar incident in 2014 suggests that APT41 (or a closely affiliated actor) has a history of carrying out such operations against the video game industry.

APT41's experience gaining access to production environments may have been a precursor to more recent supply chain compromises. The insertion of malware into a build environment for later distribution with legitimate software is a natural extension of the group's earliest activities. Additional details are provided in the section "History of Supply Chain Compromises."

- We have also observed APT41 limitedly deploy rootkits on Linux systems and Master Boot Record (MBR) bootkits, such as ROCKBOOT, on Windows systems to hide their malware and maintain persistence on victim systems. Selective deployment of ROCKBOOT suggests that APT41 reserves more advanced TTPs and malware only for high-value targets.
 - Bootkits are a stealthy means of installing malware because the code resides outside of the OS. Because bootkits are initialized prior to the OS and operate in kernel mode, OS applications and security tools may have great difficulty detecting bootkits.

- The use of bootkits among threat actors, however, is rare. It is more common for threat actors to rely on techniques such as DLL search order hijacking or modifying Windows registry keys to achieve persistence.
- The group used the Adore-NG rootkit on older Linux operating systems to hide their Linux backdoor ADORE.XSEC. Note that the Adore-ng rootkit is no longer in development and would likely not run successfully on modern Linux systems, but APT41 deployed this on a legacy game server.

APT41 is well-known for leveraging compromised digital certificates from video game studios to sign malware. The group has abused at least 19 different certificates in this way. Additional details on code-signing certificates are provided in the section "Use of Code Signing Certificates."

- In 2012, APT41 used a code-signing certificate from Mgame, a South Korean game publisher, against other gaming industry entities. The serial number for this certificate was:

01:00:00:00:00:01:30:73:85:f7:02

- A different Mgame digital certificate has been used by several other Chinese operators, including APT17, APT20, and APT31. It is unclear if this certificate was compromised at the same time as the one used by APT41 (or if it was stolen by APT41 and shared with these other groups). The serial number for this certificate was:

4e:eb:08:05:55:f1:ab:f7:09:bb:a9:ca:e3:2f:13:cd

APT41 has blatantly engaged in financially motivated activity targeting the video game industry, including manipulating virtual currencies. These activities demonstrate established connections to underground marketplaces and familiarity with monetization and laundering techniques.

- Using its access to a game production environment, in less than three hours the group generated tens of millions of dollars of a popular game's virtual currency. The money was credited to more than 1,000 accounts and most likely sold and laundered in underground markets.
- APT41 has targeted payment services specializing in handling in-game transactions and real money transfer (RMT) purchases.
- In a highly unusual case, APT41 attempted to extort a game company by deploying the Encryptor RaaS ransomware. We suggest that APT41 sought to target in-game currency but found they could not monetize the specific targeted game, so the group resorted to ransomware to attempt to salvage their efforts and profit from the compromise.
 - This ransomware was sold via a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that was available via a Tor (.onion) website. Users of the ransomware were charged a 20 percent fee for any collected ransom.
 - Since this was not the group's typical method of choice for collecting money from a victim environment, it is possible that APT41 turned to a pay-for-service ransomware to avoid having to develop such a tool or set up the associated payment and infrastructure associated with collecting the ransom.
 - APT41 attempted to deploy the ransomware through a group policy (GPO) scheduled task. However, the malware was unsuccessfully deployed because of a simple typo.
 - Figure 7 shows the ransom note associated with Encryptor RaaS, which contains default messages in both English and German (the instruction links have been redacted). Given that this is the default message, the languages in the note should not be considered when determining actor origin or location.

ATTENTION!

The files on your computer have been securely encrypted.
To get access to your files again, follow the instructions at:

ACHTUNG!


Die Dateien auf Ihrem Computer wurden ischer verschluesselt.
Um den Zugriff auf Ihre Dateien wiederzuerlangen, folgen Sie der Anleitung auf:

FIGURE 7. Screenshot of ransomware note.

Third-Party Access

In multiple instances, APT41 targeted third parties and leveraged this access to target additional victims. APT41's exploitation of third parties varied. In some instances, APT41 moved laterally from one victim environment to another in order to initiate compromise. APT41 has also used credentials compromised in previous operations.

- In 2014, APT41 compromised an online billing/payment service using VPN access between a third-party service provider and the targeted payment service. The payment service was likely targeted because it provided access to multiple gaming companies.
- Although we do not have first-hand evidence of APT41's compromise of TeamViewer, we have observed APT41 use compromised TeamViewer credentials as an entry point at multiple organizations.
 - During a 2017 compromise, APT41 initiated a TeamViewer session and transferred files that were later deleted. Filenames and creation times indicate that these may have been the HIGHNOON backdoor.
 - According to **statements** by a TeamViewer's spokesperson, the company was targeted in fall 2016. The company stated that they conducted a comprehensive security audit of its IT architecture and added additional security measures to help strengthen its security posture.



History of Supply Chain Compromises

Supply chain compromises are most likely an extension of APT41's tactics used in gaining access to gaming development environments and to other gaming organizations via third-party service providers. Public reports of supply chain compromises linked to APT41 date back to at least 2014, and technical evidence associated with these incidents was used to determine a relationship, if any, with APT41. Our assessment in each of these cases is noted in Table 1.

- As demonstrated in operations targeting the video game industry, APT41 leverages a variety of TTPs to access production environments where they can inject malicious code into legitimate files. The files are signed with valid code-signing certificates and distributed widely to end users.
- Supply chain targeting requires more effort than typically observed mass targeting methods, such as establishing a strategic web compromise (SWC) or conducting large spear-phishing campaigns.

Although APT41 supply chain compromises affect very large numbers of victims, the group limits follow-on activity to select victims most likely to reduce detection and ensure any additional malware is delivered only to intended victims. Counterintuitively, supply chain operations add an additional layer of obscurity to the group's operations because it is difficult to pinpoint the desired target set.

- In a June 2018 supply chain compromise, APT41 leveraged MAC addresses and C:\ drive volume serial numbers to identify specifically targeted victims for follow-on activity. This significantly obfuscates the targeted sector or victim set; in a typical spear-phishing campaign, for example, desired targeting can be discerned based on recipients' email addresses.

TABLE 1. Supply chain compromises.

Date	Compromised Entities	FireEye Attribution Assessment
December 2014	Online games distributed by a Southeast Asian video game distributor <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Path of Exile • League of Legends • FIFA Online 3 	Possibly APT41 or a close affiliate
March 2017	CCleaner Utility	Unconfirmed APT41
July 2017	Netsarang software packages (aka ShadowPad)	Confirmed APT41
June 2018 - November 2018	ASUS Live Update utility (aka ShadowHammer)	Stage 1 unconfirmed APT41 Reported Stage 2 confirmed APT41
July 2018	Southeast Asian video game distributor Infestation PointBlank	Confirmed APT41



December 2014

In December 2014, installers for three online games published by a Southeast Asian video game distributor were injected with the SOGU backdoor. The installer for these popular games was replaced by a malicious file that dropped the SOGU backdoor along with the normal game installer.

- The video game distributor operates servers in East and Southeast Asia for some of the most popular online games, including the three games that were compromised: Path of Exile, League of Legends, and FIFA Online 3 (Table 2).

We have observed many similarities between TTPs involved in this compromise and APT41, including:

- Targeting the same victim organization 31 days apart
- Use of code-signing certificates from the same video game-related issuer organizations

- Use of the same malware families (HIGHNOON.BIN, HIGHNOON.LITE, EASYNIGHT, FRONTWHEEL)
- Use of HIGHNOON.BIN samples with the same compile times
- Overlap in domain resolution to the same IP netblock (61.38.186.0/24) during the same time frame in 2012
- Video game-related supply chain targeting

Despite these compelling overlaps, the actors responsible for this compromise leverage additional unique tools not observed with APT41 or any other Chinese espionage group, suggesting that they are either part of APT41 and maintain their own toolset, or a close affiliate of APT41 that shares both tools and taskings.

TABLE 2. 2014 compromised games.

Game	File MD5	Malware	C&C
Path of Exile	72499e9734ea73e1593cf75c3b26cef0	SOGU	gs4.playdr2.tw
League of Legends	645925ca66990f8504d9632f7c7b3ae6	SOGU	gs4.playdr2.tw
FIFA Online 3	1b135f38c68cab15ef47dfbcbb7ab7b9	SOGU	gs4.playdr2.tw



March 2017

In March 2017, suspected Chinese espionage operators targeted CCleaner, a utility that assists in the removal of unwanted files from a computer. **According to** the parent company, Avast, the infected CCleaner was downloaded by 2.27 million customers. While we have identified some overlaps between the CCleaner activity and APT41, we do not have enough information to attribute the CCleaner compromise to APT41 at this time.

- Both APT41 and the actors in the CCleaner incident used TeamViewer during initial compromise. According to Avast, the actors used TeamViewer to compromise a developer workstation and used VBScript (x64.vbs) to drop a malicious payload.
- The compromised CCleaner update (which we call DIRTCLEANER) is believed to download a second-stage loader (MD5: 748aa5fcfa2af451c76039faf6a8684d) that contains a 32-bit and 64-bit COLDJAVA DLL payload. The COLDJAVA payload contains shellcode that loads a variant of BLACKCOFFEE (Figure 8).
 - While COLDJAVA has been used by APT41, BLACKCOFFEE has been used by other Chinese cyber espionage groups, including **APT17** and APT40. It is possible that COLDJAVA may also be shared between distinct cyber espionage operators.
- Malware samples identified in the CCleaner incident included notable shared design decisions observed in APT41 malware,

including the use of domain generation algorithms (DGA) for C&C, use of dead drop resolvers (**DDR**), and use of shellcode as primary payloads. However, FireEye malware analysis of the compromised CCleaner samples and associated COLDJAVA samples did not reveal shared code with the POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG.SHADOW malware samples used in similar supply chain incidents by APT41.

- DIRTCLEANER uses DGA to generate new C&C domains each month. This is similar to first-stage malware used in the Netsarang compromise described below.
- The BLACKCOFFEE sample reaches out to actor-controlled profiles hosted on legitimate websites to retrieve encoded commands for C&C, a technique known as DDR. The malware parses the content of the websites (listed in Table 3), looking for 12 bytes contained between the tags: "BSM1cr0Soft" and "SBM1cr0Soft." APT41 POISONPLUG samples have also used DDR for C&C.
- The POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG.SHADOW samples in similar supply chain incidents use a shellcode format that resembles PE files, while the BLACKCOFFEE backdoor that was delivered in the CCleaner compromise uses a traditional PIC blob. Additionally, there is apparent code reuse between observed POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG samples not observed in the CCleaner samples.




FIGURE 8. Malware downloaded by DIRTCLEANER.

TABLE 3. BLACKCOFFEE DDR websites.

File MD5	Legitimate DDR Websites Used for C&C
3ca2a13f646690481 dc15d78bac6d829	https://github.com/search?q=joinlur &type=Users&utf8=%E2%9C%93 https://en.search.wordpress.com/ ?src=organic&q=keepost



July 2017

In July 2017, APT41 injected malicious code into a software update package maintained by Netsarang and signed it with a legitimate Netsarang certificate in an operation referred to as **"ShadowPad"** by Kaspersky. The software package is reportedly used by hundreds of companies worldwide.

- We observed numerous opportunistic infections associated with POISONPLUG.SHADOW spanning 13 countries and a variety of industries, demonstrating the broad impact of this operation. However, we have not observed the associated second-stage at any victim organizations. Open-source reporting indicated one victim was identified in Hong Kong.
- Signing the malicious update with a legitimate NetSarang certificate is consistent with APT41's pattern of using legitimate certificates. In this case, all updates were required to be signed by Netsarang, which means APT41 had to use the code-signing certificate to subvert the update mechanism.
- Alternatively, it is also possible that APT41 injected malicious code into the package prior to compilation, circumventing the need to steal the code-signing certificate and compile it on their own.
- The first stage of the malware uses DGA, which changes its C&C servers monthly. The use of shifting network infrastructure is most likely intended to add operational robustness and to reduce detection.

The second-stage shellcode is initialized only after it is activated using a decryption key retrieved from the first-stage DNS communications. This likely allows APT41 to selectively activate the payload on specific victim systems. The second-stage payload contains the default C&C server, notped.com, which overlaps with other APT41 C&C infrastructure. Other reported APT41 domains that may also be related to the second-stage payload can be found in Table 4.

TABLE 4. Reported APT41 domains associated with POISONPLUG.SHADOW.

Domain	Associated Malware Family
notped.com	POISONPLUG.SHADOW
dnsgoogle.com	SOGU
operatingbox.com	POISONPLUG
paniesx.com	Unknown
techniciantext.com	Unknown



June 2018

In June 2018, a utility used to update ASUS computers was compromised in an operation dubbed "**ShadowHammer**" by Kaspersky. Open-source reporting **indicated** that more than 50,000 systems installed the malicious update, yet the malware was only designed to execute and retrieve second-stage malware on a designated list of approximately 600 systems, demonstrating this was a targeted campaign. **Public reporting** on the incident noted that many of the targeted MAC addresses were associated with wireless adapters from various vendors, partially indicating the operation's targeting strategy.

- Although we have limited visibility into the intended targets of this operation, we observed one of the whitelisted MAC addresses on a system at a telecom company.
- Kaspersky's analysis of the infected machines revealed that a POISONPLUG backdoor was installed as a result of the malicious update. While we have been unable to attribute the DAYJOB malware used in the incident to APT41 due to an inability to independently confirm this sequence of events, we confirm the reported stage-two POISONPLUG backdoor is attributed

to APT41, contained several gaming references, and was likely used to target the gaming industry.

- The POISONPLUG sample (MD5: 37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea) attempts to connect to a Google document that was created under the same name and email address (Tom Giardino and hrsimon59@gmail.com) that was used to target the cryptocurrency organization. It also attempts to connect to a Steam community page (Table 5).
- The POISONPLUG payload uses DDR and parses the Google document for a C&C command. The Steam community page is likely used as a fallback mechanism.
- FireEye malware analysis of the POISONPLUG sample indicates the malware is likely designed to run only one system with a C: drive volume serial number of 0xc25cff4c.
- Additional POISONPLUG samples located in Table 6 also leverage Google Document and Steam Community Pages for C&C.

TABLE 5. "ShadowHammer" stage-two POISONPLUG sample.

File MD5	C&C Domain
37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea	https://docs.google.com/document/d/1iQwnF3ibWPZ6-95VHrRAPrL6u_UT_K7X-rQrB7xt95k https://steamcommunity.com/id/oswal053

TABLE 6. POISONPLUG samples leveraging dead drop resolving.

File MD5	C&C Domain
557ff68798c71652db8a85596a4bab72	https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KJ_RJrtkKhcuJjXOCKtEOLuwH3sRi72PUhtfukncyRc
ff8d92dfbcda572ef97c142017eec658	https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TkTC3fHUvEBsBurZIGw7Kf5YsPjblpah11FksRDCuTo https://steamcommunity.com/id/119887132
b0877494d36fab1f9f4219c3defbf19	https://docs.google.com/document/d/1iQwnF3ibWPZ6-95VHrRAPrL6u_UT_K7X-rQrB7xt95k
ffd0f34739c1568797891b9961111464	https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ICySd5ZNGj9Jz8pigZsuv8IciusYKqQ0Rpe2E0zgmU https://steamcommunity.com/id/869406565



July 2018

Beginning in July 2018, APT41 appeared to have directly targeted several East and Southeast Asia-based video game developers and distributors to inject legitimate executables with the CRACKSHOT backdoor.

- Like other high-profile supply chain compromises attributed to APT41, these incidents included the incorporation of malicious code into legitimate executables and the signing of these files using legitimate digital certificates from the same compromised organization.
- APT41 used a C&C domain that masquerades as Xigncode, bugcheck.xigncodeservice.com, in the compromise of the video game PointBlank. Ironically, Xigncode is a service intended to prevent hacking and cheating in online games.
- We attribute these compromises (also reported by both **ESET** and **Kaspersky**) to APT41 based on the unique use of the CRACKSHOT backdoor and tactics consistent with APT41 operations. A list of related indicators is in Table 7.

TABLE 7. Video games industry targeting in July 2018.

Targeted Game / Platform	MD5 Hashes	Malware	C&C Domain
Southeast Asian video game platform	04fb0ccf3ef309b1cd587f609ab0e81e	CRACKSHOT	gxxservice.com
Infestation game	fcfab508663d9ce519b51f767e902806	CRACKSHOT	infestexe.com
PointBlank game	0b2e07205245697a749e422238f9f785 272537bbd2a8e2a2c3938dc31f0d2461 dd792f9185860e1464b4346254b2101b	CRACKSHOT	xigncodeservice.com

Overlaps Between Espionage and Financial Operations

Identified overlaps across various incidents attributed to APT41 demonstrate the group's dual nature. Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate crossover between espionage and financially motivated activity, as well as technical similarities in tools used across both types of operations.

- The email address hrsimon59@gmail.com was used to send spear-phishing emails to a Taiwanese newspaper with the subject lure "I have a little surprise for you :)" in an espionage campaign in August 2016 (Figure 9).
- The same email address was later used to target a cryptocurrency exchange in June 2018, demonstrating email reuse between espionage operations and financially motivated activity.

- The lure used to target the cryptocurrency exchange (displayed in Figure 5 and translated in Figure 6) referenced an online gaming platform, tying the cryptocurrency targeting to APT41's focus on video game-related targeting.
- As depicted in Figure 10, hrsimon59@gmail.com was used to create a Google document being used as a POISONPLUG (MD5: 37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea) C&C. As previously mentioned, this sample also connected to a Steam page.




FIGURE 9. Email overlaps between espionage and financial activity.




FIGURE 10. Malware overlaps across supply chain compromises.

```

seg000:00010246      movzx     edi, byte ptr [eax]
seg000:00010249      ror      esi, 8
seg000:0001024C      or       edi, 20h
seg000:0001024F      add     esi, edi
seg000:00010251      add     eax, 2
seg000:00010254      xor     esi, 7C35D9A3H
seg000:0001025A      cmp     [eax], dx
seg000:0001025D      jnz     short loc_10246
seg000:0001025F      cmp     esi, 0FD5B1261h

```

FIGURE 11. POISONPLUG API hashing (MD5: 830a09ff05eac9a5f42897ba5176a36a).

```

g000:0000F55C 0F B6 0E      movzx     ecx, byte ptr [esi]
g000:0000F55F 8B 45 F4      mov     eax, [ebp-0Ch]
g000:0000F562 C1 C8 08      ror     eax, 8
g000:0000F565 83 C9 20      or      ecx, 20h
g000:0000F568 03 C1        add     eax, ecx
g000:0000F56A 35 A3 D9 35 7C xor     eax, 7C35D9A3H
g000:0000F56F 83 C6 02      add     esi, 2
g000:0000F572 89 45 F4      mov     [ebp-0Ch], eax
g000:0000F575 66 39 3E      cmp     [esi], di
g000:0000F578 75 DD        jnz     short loc_F557
g000:0000F57A 3D 61 12 5B FD cmp     eax, 0FD5B1261h

```

FIGURE 12. POISONPLUG.SHADOW API hashing (MD5: a6c7db170bc7a4ee2cdb192247b59cd6).

- FireEye malware analysis identified source code overlaps between malware used by APT41 in May 2016 targeting of a U.S.-based game development studio and the malware observed in supply chain compromises in 2017 and 2018.
 - In May 2016, APT41 deployed a POISONPLUG sample at a U.S.-based game development studio. The stage-one loader for this sample (MD5: 830a09ff05eac9a5f42897ba5176a36a) shares code overlaps with the stage-one shellcode loader (MD5: a6c7db170bc7a4ee2cdb192247b59cd6) used in the Netsarang compromise, first reported by Kaspersky as ShadowPad. These connections, illustrated in Figure 10, led us to identify the malware used in the Netsarang incident as a variant of POISONPLUG (therefore: POISONPLUG.SHADOW).
 - The POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG.SHADOW variants share the observed commonalities:
 - The entrypoint functions for both loaders use the same instructions, constants, and structures to pass control to loading routines.
 - The layout of functions and data within the loaders are the same; for example, following the entrypoint, both loaders contain an unusual region of structured data 0x60 bytes long.
- Both loaders use the same API hashing algorithm to resolve routines from system libraries (Figure 11 and Figure 12). The routine uses byte-wise operations to compute a hash, including byte-wise rotate-right by eight bits, byte-wise binary, OR with 0x20, and byte-wise XOR using the four-byte key 0x7C35D9A3. Using this routine, the hash for kernel32.dll, a common DLL provided by Microsoft Windows, is 0xFD5B1261.
- FireEye analysis of a separate POISONPLUG payload (MD5: c8403fabda4d036a55d0353520e765c9) compiled in July 2017 and the POISONPLUG.SHADOW stage-two shellcode loader (MD5: 72584d6b7dd10c82d9118567b548b2b1) identified multiple additional plug-in similarities.
 - Core plug-in IDs between the samples are the same, including 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 201.
 - Core plug-in names are the same including Plugins, Online, Config, Install, and HTTP.
 - C&C plug-in IDs and names between both samples are the same, including 200/TCP, 201/HTTP, 202/UDP, 203/DNS, 204/HTTPS, and 205/SSL.
 - Both samples parse the C&C response by searching for "\$" characters and decoding the result.

Attribution

We assess with high confidence that APT41 is attributable to Chinese individuals who are working on behalf of the Chinese state in conducting cyber espionage operations, and that these actors are also running financially motivated campaigns for personal gain.

Two identified personas using the monikers "Zhang Xuguang" and "Wolfzhi" linked to APT41's operations have also been identified in Chinese-language forums. Attribution to these individuals is backed by identified persona information, the previous work of these individuals, their apparent expertise in programming skills, and their targeting of Chinese market-specific games. It is uncertain how many other individuals may also be associated with APT41.

- Multiple domains leveraged by early APT41 activity were registered by emails and names associated with both Zhang Xuguang and Wolfzhi (or their alternative monikers). Registrant information also included references to Beijing and Chinese phone numbers (+86 country code).

Zhang Xuguang (张旭光) registered more than a dozen domains masquerading as video games or companies with trusted relationships with video game developers/distributors. Long-running activity provides a catalog of Zhang's efforts to improve his skills and expertise over time.

- Additional names include: kbklxp, akbklxp, injuriesa, ravinder10, Addison Lau, and addison jack
- Associated email addresses:
 - akbklxp@126.com
 - akbklxp@163.com
 - hackershby@126.com
 - injuriesa@126.com
 - injuriesa@163.com
 - injuriesa@gmail.com
 - injuriesa@hotmail.com
 - injuriesa@qq.com
 - kbklxp@126.com
 - ravinder10@126.com
 - ravinder10@hotmail.com
 - ravinder10@sohu.com

- Examples of domains registered to known aliases (some of these may have since been re-registered legitimately):

- "Addison Lau"
 - agegamepay.com
 - ageofwuxia.com
 - ageofwuxia.info
 - ageofwuxia.net
 - ageofwuxia.org
 - gamewushu.com
 - micros0ff.com
 - micros0tf.com
 - serverbye.com
- "addisonjack"
 - byeserver.com

In 2005, Zhang posted personal information on "中国黑客联盟" (Chinese Hackers Alliance), a popular Chinese online forum, that listed his date of birth as 1989, that he previously lived in Inner Mongolia, and that he specialized in script hacking (Figure 13). Zhang's profile indicated he was 16, going on 17, and he was applying to be the administrator of a script hacking forum.

- Spoofed domains most likely targeted players of games such as "Age of Wuxia," a massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) themed on cultural references to dynastic China. Zhang Xugang's interest in these games is also apparent in his registration and posting on a forum dedicated to the Age of Wuxia (Figure 14).

四海边缘

====【华夏黑客同盟】版主申请表====

您在社区的注册名：四海边缘
(为方便参与工作，请尽量用的注册名和QQ上的网名相同)

性别：男

申请的版面：脚本入侵

目前居住城市：内蒙古

职业及专长：脚本入侵

年龄(请填写真实年龄)：16 过年 17 姓名：张旭光

上网类型：adsl

OICQ及OICQ网名：7891740

平均上网时间和时段(小时/天，请填写具体点)：全天(差不多) 白天下午4点-第2天早上6点

您是否做过版主(副)或聊管?(如果是，请说明在那里)：NO 没做过

您平时常活动的版面有：脚本入侵

您申请当该版版主的详细理由：希望能为华夏出份力 也能自己学到一些知识和技巧. 为了双方努力

FIGURE 13. Screenshot of Zhang's profile, with "Zhang Xuguang" highlighted in orange.

《九阴真经》官方论坛

九陰真經

2010最值得期待的网络游戏大作

标题：(封贴已共享)共享一区的号 有2区的来，，，，留下QQ [\[打印本页\]](#)

作者：my113568 时间：2011-10-8 21:57 标题：(封贴已共享)共享一区的号 有2区的来，，，，留下QQ

这几天忙 没时间玩 最多也就是晚上来看看 人物已建立 入武当 需要把二区的号给我共享 我晚上有时间玩 [本帖最后由 花儿期待 于 2011-10-8 22:12 编辑]

作者：abc4525 时间：2011-10-8 21:58

2区的。。

作者：abc4525 时间：2011-10-8 21:59

怎么内线啊 不想把QQ留在帖子

作者：tianji007 时间：2011-10-8 21:59

397355685 2区

作者：beiai685 时间：2011-10-8 22:00

QQ上谈吧，楼主 太急想进游戏里体验番了 QQ: 546778473

作者：tianji007 时间：2011-10-8 22:00

作者：qq771232465 时间：2011-10-8 22:01

作者：injuriesa 时间：2011-10-8 22:01

作者：huangenhuan 时间：2011-10-8 22:01

五区的号和你共享 给我上10分钟就好了 Q1877259221

作者：tank12341y 时间：2011-10-8 22:05

1132609844三区 只玩10分钟

FIGURE 14. Zhang posting to Age of Wuxia forum, with his alias "injuriesa" highlighted in yellow.

Wolfzhi is linked to a 2017 profile on a data science community page, which indicated that he had 10 years working experience at the time of the posting, with significant experience in Oracle and Python. Other documents linked to his email accounts also highlight his programming skills and database experience.

- Additional aliases include: wolf_zhi, wolfjiao, jiaozhiq, and jiaozhiqiang
- Examples of domains registered under the wolf_zhi alias:
 - ibmupdate.com
 - linux-update.net
 - win7update.net
- Posts in a forum provide some indication he is from Beijing or Hebei, the surrounding Chinese province. This is also consistent with information found in early domain registrations created by Wolfzhi (Figure 15).

Domain: **ibmupdate.com**

Registrant

```
wolfzhi
wolfzhi      (wolf_zhi@yahoo.com)
beijingxxx daxia
beijing
beijing, 100000
US
Tel. +86.2011111111
```

Creation Date: 2011-08-23 15:23:29

Expiration Date: 2011-08-23 15:23:29

FIGURE 15. Domain registration by Wolfzhi.

Additional indicators of Chinese attribution include: the reliance on malware used exclusively by Chinese espionage operators, the use of Chinese-language strings, time zone and operational time analysis, and targeting consistent with Beijing's interests.

- The use of tools leveraged only by several other Chinese operators such as HOMEUNIX and HIGHNOON provides some indication that APT41 relies on the similar resources and support as these other Chinese groups. APT41 also leverages PHOTO (aka "Derusbi") and SOGU (aka "Destroy RAT" and "PlugX"), tools shared much more widely among Chinese espionage groups. See the section "Links to Other Known Chinese Operators" for more details.
- An APT41 HIGHNOON sample (MD5: 36711896cf67f599305b590f195aec) from 2012 contained a process debugging path (.pdb) with the Chinese-language directory "D:\□□□□□□," which translates to "D:\Desktop\trojan."
- Compiled HTML (.chm) files used in targeting contained a language code set to "Chinese (Simplified)" despite the lure content being in the target region's language (English or otherwise).
- Compile and operational times of APT41 activity suggest the bulk of the group's work hours, 10:00 and 23:00 (UTC +8), are consistent with the Chinese workday, especially for tech sector employees on a "996 schedule."
 - Figure 4 shows a breakdown of all of the operational activity within victim environments, separated between gaming and espionage (non-gaming) activity. Analysis of the times where APT41 modified or accessed a file within a victim environment, shows a concentration between 10:00 and 18:00 (UTC+8).
- Targeting of healthcare, semiconductors, and telecoms is consistent with Chinese state interests and parallels activity from other Chinese espionage groups.

Status as Potential Contractors

We assess with moderate confidence that APT41 is constituted of contractors tasked by the Chinese state to conduct espionage operations. Individuals attributed to the group have previously indicated that they could be hired and advertised their skills and services. APT41's use of the same malware in both financial- and espionage-related operations could support their status as contractors; state employees are less likely to use such tools for personal financial gain over multiple years given the potential for greater scrutiny or punishment.

- APT41 cyber crime activity includes the use of espionage-only malware, indicating two possible conclusions: either APT41 is operating outside of state control but still working with other Chinese APT malware actors, tools, and infrastructure on a part-time or contractual basis, or APT41 is a full-time, state-sponsored APT actor but is also working outside of state control or direction for supplemental income.
 - Tools used by APT41 in financially motivated operations include the use of HOMEUNIX and PHOTO, which are non-public malware used only by other Chinese espionage actors.
 - A loose time separation between espionage and cyber crime activities provides some indication that the group divides its work hours between both types of operations. For additional details, see Figure 4 and the previous section "Financially Motivated Activity."
- **Public reports** on Chinese hackers highlight that skilled actors opt to work for private sector entities that have government contracts because of better pay.

- Underground activity dating back to 2009 indicated that Zhang Xuguang is a hacker for hire. Zhang advertised on forums that he was available for professional penetration and hacking services.
 - Zhang listed his online hours from 4:00 p.m. - 6:00 a.m., which are similar to the operational times observed at gaming targets displayed in Figure 4.
- He was also observed sharing an injection tool named Ocean hysi (海洋hysi注入工具) to demonstrate his skills, as displayed in Figure 16.

China has previously relied on contractors to bolster state resources dedicated to cyber espionage activity. Increased integration between government units and civilian entities, including contractors and freelancers, is believed to be **a key feature of Chinese cyber policy**.

- According to indictments unsealed by the U.S. Department of Justice (USD0J) in December 2018, APT10 was operated by contractors working for the China's Ministry of State Security (MSS).
- In a USD0J indictment unsealed in November 2017, individual contractors responsible for APT3 were found to be working for an MSS front company.

海洋hysi注入工具

评分: ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

海洋hysi注入工具 hysiPHP注入工具 海洋hysi注入工具 hysiPHP注入工具 海洋hysi注入工具 hysiPHP注入工具

hysi,PHP,注入

2010-03-14 上传 大小: 250KB

所需: 3积分/C币

立即下载

开通VIP

学生认证会员8折

举报
 收藏
 分享

FIGURE 16. Ocean injection tool posted by Zhang.

Links to Other Known Chinese Espionage Operators

APT41 uses many of the same tools and compromised digital certificates that have been leveraged by other Chinese espionage operators. Initial reports about HIGHNOON and its variants (reported publicly as "Winnti") dating back to at least 2013 indicated the tool was exclusive to a single group, contributing to significant conflation across multiple distinct espionage operations.

- APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM (**Microsoft**) and Winnti (**Kaspersky, ESET, Clearsky**). In some cases, the primary observed similarity in the publicly reported Winnti activity was the use of the same malware—including HIGHNOON—across otherwise separate clusters of activity.
- Previous FireEye Threat Intelligence reporting on the use of HIGHNOON and related activity was grouped together under both GREF and Mana, although we now understand this to be the work of several Chinese cyber espionage groups that share tools and digital certificates.
- APT41 reflects our current understanding of what was previously reported as GREF, as well as additional indicators and activity gathered during our extensive review of our intelligence holdings.



Certificate Overlap

A digital certificate issued by YNK Japan that was publicly reported as being used by Winnti has been used by multiple Chinese espionage operators, including APT17, and APT20, and APT41.

Issuer: CN=VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2009-2 CA
 Subject: CN=YNK JAPAN Inc
 Serial Number: 67:24:34:0d:db:c7:25:2f:7f:b7:14:b8:12:a5:c0:4d
 Issue-Date: 11/27/09 , Expiration-Date: 11/27/11

A self-signed digital certificate purporting to be from the Microsoft Certificate Authority has been used by both APT41 and APT40 to sign samples of the PHOTO backdoor.

Issuer: CN=Microsoft Certificate Authority
 Subject: CN=Microsoft Certificate Authority
 Serial Number: (Negative)77:62:e5:c6:c9:c2:75:59:b0:b8:f5:56:60:61:d8:78
 Issue-Date: 12/31/2009, Expiration-Date: 12/30/2035

The overlaps in groups observed using these certificates is illustrated in Table 8.

TABLE 8. Example of shared certificates between APT groups.

Serial Number	Subject	APT17	APT20	APT40	APT41
67:24:34:0d:db:c7:25:2f:7f:b7:14:b8:12:a5:c0:4d	YNK JAPAN Inc	X	X		X
(Negative)77:62:e5:c6:c9:c2:75:59:b0:b8:f5:56:60:61:d8:78	Microsoft Certificate Authority			X	X

Launcher Overlap

The use of DLL side-loading has been a source of continued confusion when used as an indicator for distinct operations. This **technique** uses a legitimate and often digitally signed executable to essentially trick a system into launching a malicious DLL because it has been given the same name as a legitimate DLL normally loaded by the executable. The use of a valid and digitally signed executable

allows actors to bypass host-based security measures. For this reason, it continues to be popular mechanism used by multiple groups. This also explains why the use of these DLL filenames is not a unique indicator for distinct APT operators. Table 9 contains legitimate executables used by APT41 and selected other Chinese cyber espionage groups for DLL side-loading:

TABLE 9. Legitimate files used by different APT groups for DLL side-loading.

File MD5 Hash	Filename	APT9	APT10	APT20	APT41
09b8b54f78a10c435cd319070aa13c28	nvSmartEx.exe	X	X	X	X
26a196afc8e6aff6fc6c46734bf228cb	form.exe	X			X

Code Family Overlap

A significant number of non-public tools used by APT41 are shared with other distinct Chinese espionage operators. Source code overlaps between observed code families indicate potential access to shared code repositories or common developers between groups.

- APT41 has used several malware families that have also been used by other Chinese espionage operators, including variants of HIGHNOON, HOMEUNIX, PHOTO, SOGU, and ZXSHELL, among others. Table 10 illustrates some of overlap between malware families used by APT41 and other APT groups. Note that this is only for illustration purposes and is not indicative of all observed malware families used by these APT groups or all groups that have used those families.

- HIGHNOON, one of the main code families observed being used by APT41, was also used by APT17 in 2015 to target semiconductor and chemical manufacturers.
- HOMEUNIX, another popular backdoor used by APT41, has been used by at least 14 separate Chinese espionage groups, including APT1, APT10, APT17, APT18, and APT20.
- JUMPALL is a dropper that has been observed dropping variants of the HIGHNOON, ZXSHELL, and SOGU code families attributed to APT17 and APT41.

TABLE 10. Code family overlap among different Chinese espionage groups.

Malware	APT1	APT3	APT10	APT17	APT18	APT19	APT40	APT41
BLACKCOFFEE				X			X	X
CHINACHOP				X			X	X
COLDJAVA								X
HIGHNOON				X				X
HIGHNOON.BIN				X				X
HIGHNOON.LITE								X
HOMEUNIX	X		X	X	X			X
JUMPALL				X				X
PHOTO			X	X		X	X	X
SOGU		X	X	X	X		X	X
ZXSHELL			X	X			X	X

TABLE 11. CLASSFON sample with internal name "DrvDII.dll" and contains reference to "PlusDII.dll".

File MD5 Hash	Malware	Internal Filename	Device Driver Name
9e1a54d3dc889a7f0e56753c0486fd0f	CLASSFON	DrvDII.dll	PlusDII.dll

TABLE 12. APT41 HIGHNOON.BIN samples that reference "PlusDII.DII".

File MD5 Hash	Malware	Process Debugging Path
36711896cf67f599305b590f195aec	HIGHNOON.BIN	D:\□□\□□\Anti_winmm\Applnit\Applnit\Release\Applnit.pdb
a0a96138b57ee24eed31b652ddf60d4e	HIGHNOON.BIN	H:\RBDDoor\Anti_winmm\Applnit\Applnit\Release\Applnit.pdb

- APT41 has not only shared the same tools with other Chinese espionage operators but also appears to have access to shared source code or developers as well.
 - APT41 has used CROSSWALK.BIN, a kernel driver, to circumvent firewalls and covertly send data. Another Chinese espionage group used a similar tool, CLASSFON, to covertly proxy network communications in 2011.
 - CLASSFON (MD5: 9e1a54d3dc889a7f0e56753c0486fd0f) has an internal name of DrvDII.dll and an embedded device driver that is internally named PlusDII.dll (Table 11). The PlusDII.dll filename has also been identified in APT41 HIGHNOON.BIN samples (Table 12).
 - PDB paths identified in related APT41 HIGHNOON.BIN samples contain the name "RBDDoor," which has also been identified in samples of HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON.LITE, HIGHNOON.CLI, and GEARSHIFT (Figure 17). APT41 files containing PDB paths referencing "RBDDoor" are listed in Table 13. At least two of these malware families, HIGHNOON.CLI and GEARSHIFT, have been used by APT17 and another suspected Chinese espionage group.
- Further information regarding code family overlaps between variants can be found in "Technical Annex: Additional Malware Overlaps."

H:\Double-v1\stone_srv\Bin\RbDoor64.pdb
 H:\Double\Door_wh\AppInit\x64\Release\AppInit.pdb
 H:\Double\Door_wh\RbDoorX64\x64\Release\RbDoorX64.pdb
 H:\Double\door_wh_kav\Bin\RbDoor64.pdb
 H:\RBDDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\Release\AppInit.pdb
 H:\RBDDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\x64\Release\AppInit.pdb
 H:\RBDDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\ShutDownEvent\x64\Release\ShutDownEvent.pdb
 H:\RbDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\Release\AppInit.pdb
 H:\RbDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\RbDoorX64\Release\RbDoor.pdb
 H:\RbDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\ShutDownEvent\Release\ShutDownEvent.pdb
 H:\RbDoor\Lib\WMI_SSL\RemoteLib\bin\TestRjLib.pdb
 H:\Svn\Double-v1\stone_srv\Bin\RbDoor64.pdb

FIGURE 17. PDB paths containing "RBDDoor".

TABLE 13. APT41 samples with PDB paths containing "RBDDoor".

File MD5 Hash	Malware
46a557fbdce734a6794b228df0195474	HIGHNOON
77c60e5d2d99c3f63f2aea1773ed4653	HIGHNOON
a0a96138b57ee24eed31b652ddf60d4e	HIGHNOON.BIN
7d51ea0230d4692eedc2d5a4cd66d2d	HIGHNOON.BIN
849ab91e93116ae420d2fe2136d24a87	HIGHNOON.BIN
ba08b593250c3ca5c13f56e2ca97d85e	JUMPALL
f8c89ccd8937f2b760e6706738210744	GEARSHIFT
5b26f5c7c367d5e976aaba320965cc7f	GEARSHIFT

Use of Code-Signing Certificates

APT41 regularly leverages code-signing certificates to sign malware when targeting both gaming and non-gaming organizations. Notably, most of the digital certificates being used in this manner are valid unrevoked digital certificates stolen from East Asia-based game development studios. APT41 likely signs their malware to ensure compatibility with the targeted systems and to potentially avoid detection.

- Microsoft **requires** all kernel-mode drivers to be signed in order to run on operating systems running Windows Vista or later.
- The use of code-signing certificates can also significantly decrease the likelihood that a malicious payload is detected.

Although we do not have direct evidence of APT41 specifically targeting and stealing code-signing certificates, we have some indication from targeting of affected organizations within the same time frame that digital certificates are first compromised and used to sign malware.

- Stealing private keys or compromising an organization's infrastructure to access and steal digital certificates abuses trust relationships between firms and certificate authorities. Malicious files signed with valid digital certificates can circumvent automated scanning/ blocking solutions and bypass Windows group policies which restrict unsigned code from running.
 - Even when detected, malicious files signed by a digital certificate from a trusted partner or associated business are less likely to draw suspicion. According to an advertisement in an underground marketplace, the success rate of installing a payload increases by as much as 50 percent when signing files with valid digital certificates.

- In most cases, multiple digital certificates are issued to an organization using the same public name, making it more difficult to identify a compromised certificate among others with identical names.
- Certificate authorities are responsible for revoking compromised digital certificates, although response times can vary greatly, and digital certificates can continue to be abused even long after they are first identified being misused.
- Several malware samples were signed very close to the certificate issue date, suggesting that APT41 or a related actor had access to the private key or build environment at that time. It is also possible the group acquired the private keys soon after they were issued.
- In some cases, digital certificates were used to sign malware samples just before they expired, most likely indicating the actors were actively managing a library of digital certificates for this purpose.
- Figure 18 depicts compile times of malware signed with compromised digital certificates within the time frame that the certificates were valid. All of the certificates listed in the graphic have either been revoked or are currently expired. Indicators associated with these certificates are listed in "Technical Annex: Code Signing Certificates Used by APT41."
- Alternatively, it is possible APT41 may have purchased the digital certificates used for signing malware within an underground market. FireEye researchers found that code signing certificates are currently available for sale in underground marketplaces for as little as \$399 USD, although ones that go through rigorous vetting can be sold for \$1,699 USD.

OBSERVED USE OF CODE SIGNING CERTIFICATES




FIGURE 18. First observed malware samples signed with digital certificates (white) in relation to valid certificate dates (blue).

TECHNICAL ANNEX

Attack Lifecycle




FIGURE 19. APT41 attack lifecycle.

Initial Compromise

APT41 leverages a variety of techniques to perform an initial compromise, including spear-phishing, moving laterally from trusted third parties, leveraging stolen credentials, using the CHINACHOP web shell, and accessing victim organizations using remote desktop sharing software, such as TeamViewer. APT41 often relies on the use of simple spear-phishing email with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to initially compromise their victims. However, once in a victim organization, the operation can leverage more sophisticated TTPs and deploy additional malware tools.

- In a campaign running almost one year, APT41 compromised hundreds of systems and used close to 150 unique pieces of malware including backdoors, credential stealers, keyloggers, and rootkits.
- We have observed TeamViewer credentials used as an entry point in multiple intrusions across industries. In these instances, APT41 leveraged TeamViewer to transfer malware into the compromised environment, although we do not have direct evidence of APT41 compromising TeamViewer.
 - In July 2017, APT41 initiated a TeamViewer session and transferred files that were later deleted. Filenames and creation times indicate that these may have been the HIGHNOON backdoor.
 - In May 2018, APT41 used TeamViewer for initial entry in the compromise of a healthcare company. During this intrusion, APT41 started a TeamViewer session and shortly after transferred DLL files associated with the CROSSWALK backdoor to the victim environment before deploying CROSSWALK.

The group has leveraged several exploits in their operations. Notably, APT41 was observed using proof-of-concept exploit code for CVE-2019-3396 within 23 days after the Confluence vulnerability was announced.

Observed Vulnerabilities

- CVE-2012-0158
- CVE-2015-1641
- CVE-2017-0199
- CVE-2017-11882
- CVE-2019-3396

APT41 compromised one organization and moved to a client environment.

Establish Foothold

APT41 uses a variety of malware and tools, both public and unique to the group, to establish a foothold with a victim's environment, including:

- ASPXSpy
- ACEHASH
- Beacon
- CHINACHOP
- COLDJAVA
- CRACKSHOT
- CROSSWALK
- DEADEYE
- DOWNTIME
- EASYNIGHT
- Gh0st
- HIGHNOON.LITE
- HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY
- HOTCHAI
- HKDOOR
- JUMPALL
- LATELUNCH
- LIFEBOAT
- LOWKEY
- njRAT
- POISONPLUG
- POISONPLUG.SHADOW
- POTROAST
- SAGEHIRE
- SOGU
- SWEETCANDLE
- TERA
- TIDYELF
- XDOOR
- WINTERLOVE
- ZXSHELL

APT41 has been observed using Linux and Windows variants of the same malware families, such as PHOTO and HIGHNOON. The group often initially installs its backdoors to c:\windows\temp.

We have observed APT41 attempting to masquerade their files and domains as popular anti-virus software:

- kasparsky.net
- macfee.ga
- symantecclabs.com

APT41 appears to use the commercially available Beacon backdoor that is part of the Cobalt Strike pen-testing software platform. In at least one instance, a server used for Beacon C&C was also leveraged for CROSSWALK C&C.

On multiple occasions, APT41 leveraged the Sticky Keys vulnerability and PowerShell to deploy malware families in victims' environments.

Escalate Privileges

APT41 escalates its privileges in systems by leveraging custom-made and publicly available tools to gather credentials and dump password hashes. The tools include:

- ACEHASH
- GEARSHIFT
- GOODLUCK
- Mimikatz
- NTDSDump
- PHOTO
- PwDump
- WINTERLOVE

Windows Credential Editor (WCE)

APT41 frequently uses the Windows Credential Editor to dump password hashes from memory and authenticate other user accounts.

Internal Reconnaissance

APT41 conducts network reconnaissance after using compromised credentials to log on to other systems. The group leverages built-in Windows commands, such as "netstat" and "net share," in addition to the custom and non-public malware families SOGU, HIGHNOON, and WIDETONE.

- HIGHNOON includes the ability to collect host information by enumerating active Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions.
- SOGU is capable of listing TCP and UDP network connections, respectively.
- WIDETONE is capable of conducting port scans and password brute-force attacks and collecting network information. It contains an embedded variant of a publicly available enumeration tool and can be run with the following options:
 - "-hbs" option runs a port scan on the specified subnet.
 - "-hscan" scans the specified IP range for IPC and SQL services.
 - "-enum" queries a Windows host for requested information, such as users, groups/members, policies, and more.

Lateral Movement

APT41 assesses the network architecture of an organization and identifies pivotal systems for enabling further access. The group has repeatedly identified intermediary systems that provide access to otherwise segmented parts of an organization's network (as outlined in Case Study: Video Game Industry Targeting). Once APT41 has identified intermediary systems, it moves quickly to compromise systems. In one case, hundreds of systems across several geographic regions were compromised in as little as two weeks.

APT41 uses multiple methods to perform lateral movement in an environment, including RDP sessions, using stolen credentials, adding accounts to User and Admin groups, and password brute-forcing utilities. The group will also use a compromised account to create scheduled tasks on systems or modify legitimate Windows services to install the HIGHNOON and SOGU backdoors.

- We observed APT41 using a compromised account to create a scheduled task on a system, write a binary component of HIGHNOON containing the payload and C&C information to disk, and then modify the legitimate Windows WMI Performance Adaptor (wmiApSrv) to execute the HIGHNOON payload.

APT41 frequently uses the publicly available utility WMIEXEC to move laterally across an environment. WMIEXEC is a tool that allows for the execution of WMI commands on remote machines. Examples of commands executed by the utility include:

```
cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\wmi.dll 2>&1  
cmd.exe /c del C:\wmi.dll /F > nul 2>&1  
cmd.exe /c a.bat > C:\wmi.dll 2>&1
```

Maintain Presence

To maintain presence, APT41 relies on backdoors, a Sticky Keys vulnerability, scheduled tasks, bootkits, rootkits, registry modifications, and creating or modifying startup files. APT41 has also been observed modifying firewall rules to enable file and printer sharing to allow for inbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic.

- APT41 leveraged ROCKBOOT as a persistence mechanism for PHOTO and TERA backdoors. The bootkit performs raw disk operations to bypass the typical MBR boot sequence and execute the backdoors prior to the host operating system. This technique was implemented to ensure the malware would execute at system runtime and was designed to be difficult to detect and prevent. APT41 ROCKBOOT samples have been signed with legitimate code-signing certificates from MGame and Neowiz, two South Korean video game companies.
- APT41 leveraged ADORE.XSEC, a Linux backdoor launched by the Adore-NG rootkit, throughout an organization's Linux environment. The group installed the backdoor and the Adore-NG rootkit persistently by creating a hidden shell script in "/etc/rc.d/init.d," a directory that contains the startup scripts for many system services. The Adore-NG rootkit is used to hide the backdoor and authenticate any incoming connections using a provided password.
- The group also uses CROSSWALK.BIN, FRONTWHEEL, HIGHNOON.BIN, HIGHNOON.LINUX, HOMEUNIX, and PACMAN to maintain presence.

In some instances, APT41 leveraged POISONPLUG as a first-stage backdoor to deploy the HIGHNOON backdoor in the targeted environment. We observed APT41 use PowerSploit with the capability to use WMI as a persistence mechanism. The group also deploys the SOGU and CROSSWALK malware families as means to maintain presence.

APT41 has demonstrated it is highly agile, responding quickly to changes in victim environments and incident responder activity.

- Hours after a victimized organization made changes to thwart APT41, the group registered a new C&C domain, compiled a new SOGU backdoor variant, and deployed the new backdoor to several systems across multiple geographic regions.
- APT41 sent spear-phishing emails to multiple HR employees three days after the compromise had been remediated and systems were brought back online. Within hours of a user opening the malicious attachment dropping a HOMEUNIX backdoor, APT41 regained a foothold within the environment by installing PHOTO on the organization's servers across multiple geographic regions.

Avoiding C&C Detection

At times APT41 uses legitimate websites, such as GitHub, Pastebin, and Microsoft TechNet, to avoid detection. Interestingly, some of the group's POISONPLUG malware samples leverage the Steam Community website associated with Valve, a video game developer and publisher. This technique of storing encoded or encrypted strings, known as dead drop resolvers (DDR), on legitimate websites that can subvert network defenders as traffic to and from the sites is typically benign.

The group has also configured Linux backdoors to run on ports used by legitimate applications within victim environments, enabling malicious traffic to bypass network security measures and hide malicious activity within the organization's regular application traffic.

Preventing Anti-Virus Updates

Before attempting to deploy the publicly available Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) Encryptor RaaS through group policy, APT41 blocked victim systems from retrieving anti-virus updates by accessing the DNS management console and implementing a forward lookup on the domain used for anti-virus updates to the park IP address "1.1.1.1."

Complete Mission

APT41 has been observed creating a RAR archive of targeted files for exfiltration. The group has also manipulated in-game currencies using the targets' databases after compromising production environments. During multiple engagements, APT41 attempted to remove evidence of some of its activity by deleting Bash histories, clearing Windows security and system events, and modifying DNS management to avoid anti-virus detections.

In at least one instance, the group attempted to deploy Encryptor RaaS. However, an operator's typo prevented the ransomware from executing in the victim's environment.

In another instance, APT41 deployed XMRig, a Monero cryptocurrency mining tool in a victim's environment.

TECHNICAL ANNEX

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Initial Access

t1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application
t1133	External Remote Services
t1193	Spear-phishing Attachment
t1195	Supply Chain Compromise
t1199	Trusted Relationship
t1078	Valid Accounts

Execution

t1059	Command-Line Interface
t1223	Compiled HTML File
t1106	Execution through API
t1129	Execution through Module Load
t1203	Exploitation for Client Execution
t1061	Graphical User Interface
t1170	Mshta
t1086	PowerShell
t1053	Scheduled Task
t1085	Rundll32
t1064	Scripting
t1035	Service Execution
t1204	User Execution
t1047	Windows Management Instrumentation

Persistence

t1015	Accessibility Features
t1098	Account Manipulation
t1067	Bootkit
t1136	Create Account
t1038	DLL Search Order Hijacking
t1133	External Remote Services
t1179	Hooking
t1031	Modify Existing Service
t1050	New Service
t1034	Path Interception
t1108	Redundant Access
t1060	Registry Run Keys / Start Folder
t1165	Startup Items
t1078	Valid Accounts
t1100	Web Shell

Privilege Escalation

t1134	Access Token Manipulation
t1015	Accessibility Features
t1038	DLL Search Order Hijacking
t1034	Path Interception
t1055	Process Injection
t1078	Valid Accounts
t1100	Web Shell

Defense Evasion

t1134	Access Token Manipulation
t1009	Binary Padding
t1146	Clear Command History
t1116	Code Signing
t1140	Deobfuscate / Decode Files or Information
t1089	Disabling Security Tools
t1038	DLL Search Order Hijacking
t1073	DLL Side-Loading
t1107	File Deletion
t1054	Indicator Blocking
t1070	Indicator Removal on Host
t1036	Masquerading
t1112	Modify Registry
t1170	Mshhta
t1027	Obfuscated Files or Information
t1055	Process Injection
t1014	Rootkit
t1085	Rundll32
t1064	Scripting
t1045	Software Packing
t1099	Timestamp
t1078	Valid Accounts
t1497	Virtualization and Sandbox Evasion
t1102	Web Service

Credential Access

t1098	Account Manipulation
t1110	Brute Force
t1003	Credential Dumping
t1081	Credentials in Files
t1056	Input Capture
t1145	Private Keys

Collection

t1119	Automated Collection
t1213	Data from Information Repositories
t1005	Data from Local System
t1056	Input Capture
t1113	Screen Capture

Discovery

t1087	Account Discovery
t1482	Domain Trust Discovery
t1083	File and Directory Discovery
t1069	Permission Groups Discovery
t1057	Process Discovery
t1063	Security Software Discovery
t1082	System Information Discovery
t1016	System Network Configuration Discovery
t0149	System Network Connections Discovery
t1033	System Owner/User Discovery
t1124	System Time Discovery
t1497	Virtualization and Sandbox Evasion

Lateral Movement

t1075	Pass the Hash
t1076	Remote Desktop Protocol
t1105	Remote File Copy

Command and Control

t1043	Commonly Used Port
t1090	Connection Proxy
t1094	Custom Command and Control Protocol
t1132	Data Encoding
t1001	Data Obfuscation
t1483	Domain Generation Algorithms
t1219	Remote Access Tools
t1105	Remote File Copy
t1071	Standard Application Layer Protocol
t1032	Standard Cryptographic Protocol
t1095	Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol
t1065	Uncommonly Used Port

Exfiltration

t1002	Data Compressed
t1022	Data Encrypted
t1041	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel

Impact

t1487	Data Encrypted for Impact
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TECHNICAL ANNEX

Code-Signing Certificates
Used by APT41

TABLE 14. Code-signing certificates used by APT41.

Serial	Common Name	Issue Date	Expiry Date	Status
0b:72:79:06:8b:eb:15:ff:e8:06:0d:2c:56:15:3c:35	Guangzhou YuanLuo Technology Co.	6/12/12	6/12/13	Revoked
18:63:79:57:5a:31:46:e2:6b:ef:c9:0a:58:0d:1b:d2	Webzen Inc.	8/2/11	9/30/13	Revoked
63:66:a9:ac:97:df:4d:e1:73:66:94:3c:9b:29:1a:aa	xlgames	7/5/11	7/4/12	Revoked
5c:2f:97:a3:1a:bc:32:b0:8c:ac:01:00:59:8f:32:f6	Neowiz CORPORATION	11/16/11	12/15/12	Expired
01:00:00:00:00:01:30:73:85:f7:02	Mgame Corp	6/9/11	6/9/12	Expired
4c:0b:2e:9d:2e:f9:09:d1:52:70:d4:dd:7f:a5:a4:a5	Fuqing Dawu Technology Co.	1/31/13	1/31/14	Revoked
14:0d:2c:51:5e:8e:e9:73:9b:b5:f1:b2:63:7d:c4:78	Guangzhou YuanLuo Technology Co.	10/22/13	10/22/14	Revoked
58:01:5a:cd:50:1f:c9:c3:44:26:4e:ac:e2:ce:57:30	Nanjing Ranyi Technology Co.	8/8/12	8/8/13	Revoked
7b:d5:58:18:c5:97:1b:63:dc:45:cf:57:cb:eb:95:0b	XL Games Co.	6/21/12	6/21/13	Revoked
47:6b:f2:4a:4b:1e:9f:4b:c2:a6:1b:15:21:15:e1:fe	Wemade Entertainment co.	3/2/14	1/9/16	Revoked
53:0c:e1:4c:81:f3:62:10:a1:68:2a:ff:17:9e:25:80	NetSarang Computer	10/13/16	11/12/18	Revoked
30:d3:c1:67:26:5b:52:0c:b8:7f:25:84:4f:95:cb:04	Shanda Games	10/29/13	12/27/16	Revoked
54:c6:c1:40:6f:b4:ac:b5:d2:06:74:e9:93:92:c6:3e	GameUS Inc	5/15/14	7/13/16	Expired
1e:52:bb:f5:c9:0e:c1:64:d0:5b:e0:e4:16:61:52:5f	En Masse Entertainment	2/3/15	4/5/17	Expired
fd:f2:83:7d:ac:12:b7:bb:30:ad:05:8f:99:9e:cf:00	Zepetto Co.	5/10/18	7/1/19	Expired
25:f8:78:22:de:56:d3:98:21:59:28:73:ea:09:ca:37	Electronics Extreme Limited	1/20/17	1/20/19	Expired
67:24:34:0d:db:c7:25:2f:7f:b7:14:b8:12:a5:c0:4d	YNK JAPAN Inc	11/27/09	11/27/11	Revoked

TECHNICAL ANNEX

Additional Malware Overlaps

Background

Throughout the course of our analysis, we consolidated multiple malware families into a single family with variants based on identified overlaps. Some of the malware families, such as HIGHNOON, are shared with other suspected Chinese espionage groups. The malware families contain similar functionalities, code overlaps, and encoding routines. Detailed descriptions on specific malware families are listed as follows.

```

char *v8; // ecx
int v9; // eax
char *v10; // eax
char *v11; // [esp+10h] [ebp-4h]

v1 = (char *)a1 + a1[15];
v2 = (char *)VirtualAlloc*((LPVOID *)v1 + 13), *((_DWORD *)v1 + 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u);
v11 = v2;
if ( !v2 )
{
    result = (char *)VirtualAlloc(0, *((_DWORD *)v1 + 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u);
    v11 = result;
    if ( !result )
        return result;
    v2 = result;
}
v4 = GetProcessHeap();
v5 = (int *)HeapAlloc(v4, 0, 0x14u);
v5[1] = (int)v2;
v5[3] = 0;
v5[2] = 0;
v5[4] = 0;
VirtualAlloc(v2, *((_DWORD *)v1 + 20), 0x1000u, 0x40u);
v6 = (char *)VirtualAlloc(v2, *((_DWORD *)v1 + 21), 0x1000u, 0x40u);
memcpy(v6, a1, a1[15] + *((_DWORD *)v1 + 21));
v7 = (int)&v6[a1[15]];
*v5 = v7;
*(_DWORD *)v7 + 52 = v11;
sub_10002150((int)a1, (int)v1, v5);
v8 = (char *)*((_DWORD *)v1 + 13);
if ( v11 != v8 )
    sub_10002370(v5, v11 - v8);
if ( !sub_100023F0(v5) )
    goto LABEL_10;
sub_10002280(v5);
v9 = *((_DWORD *)v5 + 40);
if ( v9 )
{
    v10 = &v11[v9];
    if ( !v10 || !((int (__stdcall *)(char *, int, _DWORD))v10)(v11, 1, 0) )
    {
        LABEL_10
        sub_100025B0(v5);
        return 0;
    }
    v5[4] = 1;
}
return (char *)v5;
000021BF sub_1000020B0;52 (100021BF)

```

HIGHNOON

HIGHNOON variants include HIGHNOON.LITE, HIGHNOON.BIN, HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY, HIGHNOON.CLI, and HIGHNOON.LINUX. Some of the variants, such as HIGHNOON.BIN, were used by multiple suspected Chinese groups, including APT41 and APT17.

HIGHNOON.BIN and HIGHNOON.LITE

HIGHNOON.BIN (MD5: 2862c9bff365dc8d51ba0c4953869d5d) and HIGHNOON.LITE (MD5: b5120174d92f30d3162ceda23e201cea) contain an identical in memory DLL loading function, which can be seen in Figure 20.

```

char *v7; // [esp+60h] [ebp-Ch]
_DWORD *v8; // [esp+68h] [ebp-4h]

8  if ( !a1 )
9      return 0;
10 v7 = (char *)a1 + a1[15];
11 IpAddress = (char *)VirtualAlloc*((LPVOID *)v7 + 13), *((_DWORD *)v7 + 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u);
12 if ( !IpAddress )
13 IpAddress = (char *)VirtualAlloc(0, *((_DWORD *)v7 + 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u);
14 if ( !IpAddress )
15     return 0;
16 v2 = GetProcessHeap();
17 v8 = HeapAlloc(v2, 0, 0x14u);
18 v8[1] = IpAddress;
19 v8[3] = 0;
20 v8[2] = 0;
21 v8[4] = 0;
22 VirtualAlloc(IpAddress, *((_DWORD *)v7 + 20), 0x1000u, 0x40u);
23 Dst = (char *)VirtualAlloc(IpAddress, *((_DWORD *)v7 + 21), 0x1000u, 0x40u
24 memcpy(Dst, a1, *((_DWORD *)v7 + 21) + a1[15]);
25 *v8 = &Dst[a1[15]];
26 *(_DWORD *)v8 + 52 = IpAddress;
27 sub_4020A0(a1, v7, v8);
28 v4 = (int)&IpAddress[*((_DWORD *)v7 + 13)];
29 if ( v4 )
30     sub_402320(v8, v4);
31 if ( sub_402320(v8) )
32 {
33     sub_4021C0(v8);
34     if ( !*(_DWORD *)v8 + 40 )
35         return v8;
36     v3 = &IpAddress[*((_DWORD *)v8 + 40)];
37     if ( v3 && ((int (__stdcall *)(char *, int, _DWORD))v3)(IpAddress, 1, 0) )
38     {
39         v8[4] = 1;
40         return v8;
41     }
42 }
43 sub_402740(v8);
44 return 0;
45 }
46
47
48
00002084 t_in_memory_DLL_loader;46 (402084)

```

FIGURE 20. HIGHNOON.BIN and HIGHNOON.LITE in memory DLL loading function.

HIGHNOON (MD5: df143c22465b88c4bdb042956fef8121) uses an API hashing algorithm to resolve its imports at runtime, but the layout of the in-memory DLL loading functionality is identical between HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON.BIN, and HIGHNOON.LITE samples (Figure 21). The specific samples of HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON.BIN, and HIGHNOON.LITE referenced previously are not attributed to APT41 but are instead used by other suspected Chinese groups.

- HIGHNOON and HIGHNOON.LITE also share the same configuration encoding routine.
- HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON.LITE, and HIGHNOON.BIN store a unique host identifier under the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\HTMLHelp

```

resolve_APIS():
v3 = (_DWORD *)((char *)a1 + a1[15]);
v4 = (_DWORD *)VirtualAlloc(v3[13], v3[20]. 0x2000, 0x40);
if ( !v4 )
{
    result = (_DWORD *)VirtualAlloc(0, v3[20], 0x2000, 0x40);
    if ( !result )
        return result;
    v4 = result;
}
v6 = (void *)GetProcessHeap(0, 0x14);
v7 = HeapAlloc(v6, v13, v14);
v7[1] = v4;
v7[3] = 0;
v7[2] = 0;
v7[4] = 0;
VirtualAlloc(v4, v3[20], 0x1000, 0x40);
v8 = (char *)VirtualAlloc(v4, v3[21], 0x1000, 0x40);
qmemcpy(v8, a1, a1[15] + v3[21]);
v9 = (int)&v8[*( _DWORD *) (a3 + 60)];
*v7 = v9;
*( _DWORD *) (v9 + 52) = a1;
sub_100016A0(a3, v3, v7);
v10 = (char *)v3[13];
if ( a1 != ( _DWORD *)v10 )
    sub_10001830(v7, (char *)a1 - v10);
if ( !sub_10001770(v7) )
    return 0;
sub_10001770(v7);
v11 = *( _DWORD *) (*v7 + 40);
if ( v11 )
{
    v12 = (char *)a1 + v11;
    if ( !v12 || !((int (cdecl *) (_DWORD *, int, _DWORD))v12)(a1, 1, 0) )
        return 0;
    v7[4] = 1;
}
return v7;
}

```

FIGURE 21. HIGHNOON DLL loading function.

HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON

HIGHNOON.LINUX is a Linux variant of HIGHNOON that shares multiple component overlaps with HIGHNOON.

- HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON share a message component that use the same headers and XOR encoding.
- The two share a transport component that provides HTTP, Fake TLS, and raw protocol options.
- HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON share a similar commands component. The code for processing the commands "Tunnel" and "Plus" (to add plugins) are nearly identical.

CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN

CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN share several notable overlaps. Significantly, the two code families share a large amount of code in their respective shellcode components (Figure 22).

Shellcode Component Overlaps

- The shellcode that handles C&C messages uses the same function in both families.
 - Interestingly, additional functions used for C&C in CROSSWALK.BIN are present within CROSSWALK but unused.
 - This suggests the families are slightly different builds originating from the same codebase.
- CROSSWALK.BIN's user-mode shellcode and the shellcode appended at the end of CROSSWALK contain approximately three-fourths of the same code.
- Both CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN's backdoors are implemented through user-mode shellcode.

```

37  __int64 v37; // [rsp+58h] [rbp+10h]
38
39  v37 = a2;
40  v2 = 0;
41  v3 = a1[47] == 1;
42  v4 = a1;
43  strcpy(&v36, "ok1234\n");
44  if ( v3 )
45  {
46  LABEL_14:
47      if ( cgp_dyn_resolve_maybe_03(v4) <= 0 )
48          return v2;
49      v24 = v4[24];
50      v25 = *(v4 + 13);
51      v26 = v4[48];
52      *(v4 + 11) = v4;
53      *(v4 + 10) = v4 - v24;
54      v27 = v4 + v25 - v24;
55      v28 = (*(v4 + 31))(0i64, v26, 4096i64, 4i64);
56      *(v4 + 25) = v28;
57      if ( !v28 )
58          return v2;
59      v29 = v4[25];
60      v30 = *(v4 + 28);
61      if ( v29 > 0 )
62      {
63          v31 = v27;
64          do
65          {
66              *v31++ ^= v30;
67              --v29;
68          }
69          while ( v29 );
70      }
71      if ( sub_BBA0(v4, v27) <= 0 )
72          return v2;
73      v32 = v4[25];
74      v33 = *(v4 + 28);
75      if ( v32 > 0 )
76      {
77          do
78          {
79              *v27++ ^= v33;
80              --v32;
81          }
82          while ( v32 );
83      }
84      (*(v4 + 25) + 2032i64) = *(v4 + 17) + *v4 + 10;
85      *(v4 + 35) = *(v4 + 17) + *(v4 + 10);
86      (*(v4 + 25) + 752i644)(32775i64);
87      v34 = (*(v4 + 25) + 32i64)(0i64, 0i64, *(v4 + 10) + *(v4 + 95), v4, 0, 0i64);
88      (*(v4 + 35))(&v36);
89      (*(v4 + 25) + 272i64)(v34, 0xFFFFFFFFi64);
90      (*(v4 + 25) + 481i64)(v24);
91      v2 = 1;
92      return v2;
93  }
94  v5 = a1[12];
95  v6 = a1[13];
96  v7 = a1[11];
97  v8 = v4[24];
98  v9 = v4[19];
99  v10 = v4[25];
100 v4[12] = v7;
101 v11 = v10 + v9 + v8;
102 v4[13] = v7;
103 v12 = 0;
104 v13 = v10 + v9 + v8;
105 v14 = v4 - v8;
106 do
107 {
108     v15 = *v14++;
109     v12 = v15 + __ROR4__(v12, v7);
110     --v13;
111 }
112 while ( v13 );
113 if ( v6 != v12 )
114     return v2;
115 v16 = v4 + 48;
116 v17 = v9 + v10 - 192;
117 v18 = v17;
118 if ( v17 > 0 )
119 {
120     v19 = v4[14];

```

```

39  __int64 v39; // [rsp+58h] [rbp+10h]
40
41  v39 = a2;
42  v2 = 0;
43  v3 = a1[47] == 1;
44  v4 = a1;
45  strcpy(&v38, "ok1234\n");
46  if ( v3 )
47  {
48  LABEL_14:
49      if ( cgp_dyn_resolve_maybe_03(v4) <= 0 )
50          return v2;
51      v24 = v4[24];
52      v25 = *(v4 + 13);
53      v26 = v4[48];
54      *(v4 + 11) = v4;
55      *(v4 + 10) = v4 - v24;
56      v27 = v4 + v25 - v24;
57      v28 = (*(v4 + 31))(0i64, v26, 4096i64, 4i64);
58      *(v4 + 25) = v28;
59      if ( !v28 )
60          return v2;
61      v29 = v4[25];
62      v30 = *(v4 + 28);
63      if ( v29 > 0 )
64      {
65          v31 = v27;
66          do
67          {
68              *v31++ ^= v30;
69              --v29;
70          }
71          while ( v29 );
72      }
73      if ( sub_8C58(v4, v27) <= 0 )
74          return v2;
75      v32 = v4[25];
76      v33 = *(v4 + 28);
77      if ( v32 > 0 )
78      {
79          do
80          {
81              *v27++ ^= v33;
82              --v32;
83          }
84          while ( v32 );
85      }
86      (*(v4 + 25) + 2032i64) = *(v4 + 17) + *v4 + 10;
87      *(v4 + 35) = *(v4 + 17) + *(v4 + 10);
88      (*(v4 + 25) + 752i644)(32775i64);
89      v34 = (*(v4 + 25) + 32i64)(0i64, 0i64,
90              *(v4 + 35))(&v38);
91      (*(v4 + 25) + 272i64)(v36, 0xFFFFFFFFi64);
92      (*(v4 + 25) + 481i64)(v36);
93      v2 = 1;
94      return v2;
95  }
96  v5 = a1[12];
97  v6 = a1[13];
98  v7 = a1[11];
99  v8 = v4[24];
100 v9 = v4[19];
101 v10 = v4[25];
102 v4[12] = v7;
103 v11 = v10 + v9 + v8;
104 v4[13] = v7;
105 v12 = 0;
106 v13 = v10 + v9 + v8;
107 v14 = v4 - v8;
108 do
109 {
110     v15 = *v14++;
111     v12 = v15 + __ROR4__(v12, v7);
112     --v13;
113 }
114 while ( v13 );
115 if ( v6 != v12 )
116     return v2;
117 v16 = v4 + 48;
118 v17 = v9 + v10 - 192;
119 v18 = v17;
120 if ( v17 > 0 )
121 {
122     v19 = v4[14];

```

0000B60A cgp_decode_shellcode:62 (B60A)

00008590 cgp_decode_shellcode:49 (8590)

FIGURE 22. CROSSWALK (left) and CROSSWALK.BIN (right) shellcode.

Obfuscation and Anti-Analysis Overlaps

- Both code families share the same function at the start of their shellcode to de-obfuscate subsequent shellcode.
- A key function within the shellcode component that generates a semi-random XOR key and is used in multiple code locations for decoding is identical in CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN.
- Both use the same function for import resolution via an ASCII hash.

```
strcpy(&v22, "r c:%d,1:%d\n");
v11 = 0i64;
v12 = 0;
(*(v3 + 2032))(&v22, v8, v5);
switch ( *msg_type )
{
case 0x64u:
if ( msg_type[1] != 216 )
{
v16 = 100;
goto LABEL_37;
}
v21 = (*(v9 + 248))(0i64, 216i64, 4096i64, 4i64);
if ( !v21 )
return 0;
(*(v9 + 200) + 1856i64)(v21, v7, msg_type[1]);
if ( (*(v9 + 200) + 928i64))(*(v9 + 832), 100i64, v21, msg_type[1]) >
0 )
return 1;
v10 = 0;
v14 = (*(v9 + 200) + 320i64)();
v15 = 7021i64;
goto LABEL_42;
case 0x6Eu:
return 1;
case 0x78u:
if ( msg_type[1] != 16 )
{
v16 = 120;
goto LABEL_37;
}
v20 = (*(v9 + 248))(0i64, 16i64, 4096i64, 4i64);
if ( !v20 )
return 0;
(*(v9 + 200) + 1856i64)(v21, v7, msg_type[1]);
if ( (*(v9 + 200) + 928i64))(*(v9 + 832), 100i64, v21, msg_type[1]) >
0 )
return 1;
v10 = 0;
v14 = (*(v9 + 200) + 320i64)();
v15 = 7021i64;
goto LABEL_42;
case 0x7Au:
v19 = msg_type[1];
if ( v19 <= 0x1000 )
{
if ( v19 )
v11 = (*(v9 + 248))(0i64, 16i64, 4096i64, 4i64);
if ( !v11 )
return 10;
(*(v9 + 200) + 1856i64)(v11, v7, msg_type[1]);
v12 = msg_type[1];
}
if ( (*(v9 + 200) + 928i64))(*(v9 + 832), 122i64, v11, v12) > 0 )
return 1;
v14 = (*(v9 + 200 + 320i64)());
v15 = 7023i64;
goto LABEL_42;
}
v16 = 122;
goto LABEL_37;
case 0x82u:
```

However, there are differences between the two malware families, including how they communicate to C&C servers.

- CROSSWALK beacons with HTTP GET and POST requests, while CROSSWALK.BIN uses a custom binary protocol.
- CROSSWALK.BIN contains a driver component for covert C&C, which CROSSWALK lacks.
- Both families contain similar code to process identical message types, but their answers differ.
 - CROSSWALK.BIN answers to 0x78 and 0x7A message types by calling large functions wrapping the business logic.
 - CROSSWALK has different, much shorter code embedded directly in the "case" statement.

```
strcpy(&fmt_msg, "r c%d,1:%d\n");
if ( !v3 )
goto LABEL_48;
v6 = sub_3398();
v2 = v6;
if ( v6 == 2 )
return 1;
if ( v6 <= 0 )
return v2;
LABEL_48:
v7 = (msg_type + 11);
(*(v5 + 200) + 1872i64))(&fmt_msg, *msg_type, msg_type[1]);
switch ( *msg_type )
{
case 0x64u:
(*(v5 + 200 + 1872i64))(v5 + 1320, 22i64);
v13 = cgp_cb_msgtype_0x64_wrapper(v5, (msg_type + 11));
v9 = v5;
if ( v13 > 0 )
{
*(v5 + 760) = 1;
if ( sub_5F44(v5) > 0 )
return 1;
v9 = v5;
}
v11 = 100;
goto LABEL_43;
case 0x6Eu:
return 1;
case 0x78u:
v10 = cgp_cb_msgtype_0x78(v5, v8, msg_type + 11);
goto LABEL_38;
case 0x7Au:
v10 = cgp_cb_msgtype_07A(v5, v8, (msg_type + 11));
goto LABEL_38;
}
```

FIGURE 23. CROSSWALK (left) and CROSSWALK.BIN (right) code for answering different C&C message types.

TECHNICAL ANNEX

Malware Used by APT41

TABLE 15. Malware used by APT41.

Malware	Description	Detected as
ACEHASH	ACEHASH is a credential theft/password hash dumping utility. The code may be based in Mimikatz and appears to be publicly available.	FE_Trojan_AceHash
ADORE.XSEC	ADORE.XSEC is a Linux backdoor that may be used with the ADORE rootkit.	FE_APT_Backdoor_Linux64_ADORE_1 FE_APT_Rootkit_Linux64_ADORE_1 FE_APT_Rootkit_ADORE
ASPXSPY	ASPXSPY is a publicly available web shell that may contain the text "ASPXSpy Ver: 2009."	FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_1 FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_2 FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_3 FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_4
BEACON	BEACON malware is a backdoor that is commercially available as part of the Cobalt Strike software platform, commonly used for pen-testing network environments. The malware supports several capabilities, such as injecting and executing arbitrary code, uploading and downloading files, and executing shell commands.	FE_Backdoor_Win_BEACON_1 FE_Trojan_PS1_BEACON_1
CHINACHOP	CHINACHOP is a simple code injection web shell that can execute Microsoft .NET code within HTTP POST commands. This allows CHINACHOP to upload and download files, execute applications with web server account permissions, list directory contents, access Active Directory, access databases, and perform any other action allowed by the .NET runtime. CHINACHOP is composed of at least two parts: a small bit of code on a server and a client that provides C&C.	FE_Webshell_JSP_CHOPPER_1 FE_Webshell_Java_CHOPPER_1 FE_Webshell_MSIL_CHOPPER_1
COLDJAVA	COLDJAVA is a backdoor that drops shellcode and a BLACK-COFFEE variant payload into the Windows registry.	FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_Dropper FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_64 FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_32 FE_APT_Backdoor_COLDJAVA FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_Launcher
CRACKSHOT	CRACKSHOT is a downloader that can download files, including binaries, and run them from the hard disk or execute them directly in memory. It is also capable of placing itself into a dormant state.	FE_Backdoor_Win32_CRACKSHOT_1 Backdoor.Win.CRACKSHOT
CROSSWALK	CROSSWALK is a skeletal, modular backdoor capable of system survey and adding modules in response to C&C replies.	FE_APT_Backdoor_Win_CROSSWALK_1 FE_APT_Loader_Win_CROSSWALK_1 APT.Backdoor.Win.CROSSWALK
CROSSWALK.BIN	CROSSWALK.BIN is a kernel driver that can implement firewall-level filters to detect tasking packets and covertly send data.	FE_APT_Dropper_Win64_CROSSWALK_1 FE_APT_Dropper_Win64_CROSSWALK_2 FE_APT_Trojan_Win64_CROSSWALK_1

TABLE 15. Malware used by APT41.

Malware	Description	Detected as
DEADEYE	DEADEYE is a downloader that is installed as a Service DLL. It can use RC5 encryption to decrypt and install payloads obtained from its C&C server.	FE_APT_Loader_Win64_DEADEYE_1 FE_APT_Loader_Win64_DEADEYE_2
DOWNTIME	DOWNTIME is a backdoor dropped as an embedded PE file to a variety of locations on disk or loaded and executed in memory. The final payload is a DLL used to install, manage, and execute plugin DLLs.	FE_Dropper_Win32_DOWNTIME_1 FE_Loader_Win32_DOWNTIME_1
EASYNIGHT	EASYNIGHT is a loader observed used with several malware families, including HIGHNOON and HIGHNOON.LITE. The loader often acts as a persistence mechanism via search order hijacking.	FE_APT_Loader_Win_EASYNIGHT_1
ENCRYPTORRAAS	ENCRYPTORRAAS (Encryptor RaaS) is a ransomware that encrypts all files on the system that match an included file extensions list. As is typical of most ransomware, a combination of both public-key and symmetric-key cryptography is used to encrypt the data. File data is encrypted using RC6, with the RC6 key for each file being encrypted with RSA. A ransom note in the form of a text file, typically named "readme_liesmich_encryptor_raas.txt," is dropped in every directory in which a file was encrypted. Encryptor RaaS was sold via a RaaS operation that was available around the 2015–2016 time frame via a Tor (.onion) website.	FE_Ransomware_Win32_ENCRYPTORRAAS_1 FE_Ransomware_Win32_ENCRYPTORRAAS_2
FRONTWHEEL	FRONTWHEEL is a driver for the HIGHNOON.BIN backdoor.	FE_APT_Rootkit_Win64_FRONTWHEEL_1
GEARSHIFT	GEARSHIFT is a memory-only dropper for two keylogger DLLs. It is designed to replace a legitimate Fax Service DLL.	FE_APT_Keylogger_GEARSHIFT
GHOST	Gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT) derived from publicly available source code. It provides threat actors with the ability to perform screen and audio captures, enable a webcam, list and kill processes, open a command shell, wipe event logs, and create, manipulate, delete, launch, and transfer files.	Backdoor.APT.Gh0stRat Backdoor.APT.Gh0st Trojan.Ghost
GOODLUCK	GOODLUCK is a credential-stealing DLL that modifies the registry, so it loads when a user logs on to the system. It steals credentials from the logon screen and saves the information to a local file.	Hacktool.APT.GOODLUCK
HIGHNOON	HIGHNOON is a backdoor that may consist of multiple components. The components may include a loader, a DLL, and a rootkit. Both the loader and the DLL may be dropped together, but the rootkit may be embedded in the DLL. The HIGHNOON loader may be designed to run as a Windows service.	FE_APT_Backdoor_Win64_HIGHNOON_1 FE_APT_Dropper_HIGHNOON_B FE_APT_Loader_Win64_HIGHNOON_2 FE_APT_Loader_Win64_HIGHNOON_3 FE_APT_Rootkit_Win64_HIGHNOON_1 FE_APT_Rootkit_Win64_HIGHNOON_2 FE_APT_Rootkit_Win64_HIGHNOON_3

TABLE 15. Malware used by APT41.

Malware	Description	Detected as
HIGHNOON.BIN	HIGHNOON.BIN is a modified version of the Windows DLL apphelp.dll, which is loaded via search order hijacking. HIGHNOON.BIN contains a malicious shellcode backdoor that is loaded into memory at runtime.	FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_HIGHNOON_1 FE_APT_Loader_Win32_HIGHNOON_1 FE_APT_Loader_Win64_HIGHNOON_1 FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_HIGHNOON_2 APT.Backdoor.Win.HIGHNOON APT.Backdoor.Win.HIGHNOON
HIGHNOON.LITE	HIGHNOON.LITE is a standalone, non-persistent variant of the HIGHNOON backdoor. This version accepts a hostname and port on the command line. If no port is specified, the malware will use port 80 by default. HIGHNOON.LITE can download and execute additional memory-resident modules after it authenticates with the C&C server.	FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_HIGHNOON_7
HIGHNOON.LINUX	HIGHNOON.LINUX is a Linux backdoor designed to operate with a rootkit and can launch and establish persistence for an sshd client whose presence and activity is hidden by the rootkit.	FE_APT_Trojan_Linux64_HIGHNOON_1 FE_APT_Rootkit_Linux64_HIG HNOON_1
HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY	HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY is a variant of HIGHNOON that utilizes legitimate websites hosting encoded base64 strings that decode to the actual C2 address.	TROJAN.APT.PASTEBOY
HKDOOR	HKDOOR (aka Hacker's Door) is a remote administration tool designed as a DLL that can either run as a service or with rundll32.exe. HKDOOR drops and installs a kernel rootkit and has a variety of capabilities, including manipulating files and processes, connecting to URLs, and shutting down the compromised system. All HKDOOR's string resources are encoded with a transposition algorithm.	Backdoor.APT.HKDOOR
HOMEUNIX	HOMEUNIX is primarily a generic launcher for downloaded plugins. The plugins are stored in a memory buffer and then loaded and linked manually by the malware, meaning the plugins never have to touch disk. However, HOMEUNIX may also store and save plugins. The plugins will run after the system is rebooted without the actor having to send them again to the victim system.	FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_1 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_2 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_3 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_4 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_5 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_6 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_7 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_8 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_9 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_10 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_11 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_12 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_13 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_14 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_15 FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_16 APT.Backdoor.Win.HOMEUNIX Backdoor.HOMEUNIX.SNK.DNS Trojan.APT.9002, Backdoor.APT.9002

TABLE 15. Malware used by APT41.

Malware	Description	Detected as
HOTCHAI	HOTCHAI is a backdoor that receives and XOR-decodes a DNS response message to retrieve the true C&C IP address.	FE_APT_Backdoor_HOTCHAI
JUMPALL	JUMPALL is a malware dropper that has been observed dropping HIGHNOON/ZXSHELL/SOGU.	FE_Dropper_Win_JUMPALL_1 FE_Dropper_Win_JUMPALL_2
LATELUNCH	LATELUNCH is a loader that decodes a file specified on the command line and loads and executes it in memory.	FE_Loader_Win64_LATELUNCH_1
LIFEBOAT	LIFEBOAT is a backdoor that has the capability to communicate with its C&C over HTTP.	FE_APT_Dropper_Win32_LIFEBOAT_1 FE_APT_Downloader_Win32_LIFEBOAT_1 APT.Downloader.Win.LIFEBOAT
LOWKEY	LOWKEY is a passive backdoor that utilizes a user mode rootkit to provide covert communications with the backdoor component by forwarding packets in between a TCP Socket and a named pipe.	FE_APT_ROOTKIT_WIN64_LOWKEY_1 FE_APT_LOADER_WIN64_LOWKEY_1 FE_APT_BACKDOOR_WIN64_LOWKEY_1 APT.BACKDOOR.Win.LOWKEY
NJRAT	njRAT is a RAT project that was in development possibly as early as 2010, and it has seen a number of incremental updates since that time. The author of njRAT is widely believed to be a Kuwaiti actor using the handle "njq8." njq8, whose real name is believed to be Naser Al Mutairi, and who has previously used the handles "NJN" and "xNJQ8x," has been involved in the development of multiple hacking tools, including RATs, worms, crypters, and binders. He is, however, primarily known as the developer of njRAT, which he has distributed on private hacking forums and more visibly via Twitter.	Trojan.Njrat Backdoor.Bladabindi Trojan.Bladabindi Backdoor.MSIL.Bladabindi Trojan.Bladabindi.F Trojan.Bladabindi.njRat Trojan.Bladabindi.DNS Backdoor.Bladabindi.DNS Backdoor.Ratenjay Backdoor.LV Backdoor.njRat.MVX Backdoor.njRat.MVX Win.Worm.Njrat-2 Trojan.NjRAT, Win.Worm.Njrat Malware.DTI.Bladabindi, Trojan.MSIL.Bladabindi Hacktool.Bladabindi
PACMAN	PACMAN is a backdoor designed to run as a service. Once active, PACMAN calls out to a hard-coded C&C domain. PACMAN has the following capabilities: retrieve drive types, terminate processes, create directories, obtain a directory listing, move files, return file attributes, remove directories, create files, read files, and copy files. PACMAN can also extract credentials from Internet Explorer.	FE_Backdoor_Win32_PACMAN_1 Backdoor.Win.PACMAN
PHOTO	PHOTO is a DLL backdoor that can obtain directory, file, and drive listings, create a reverse shell, perform screen captures, record video and audio, list, terminate, and create processes, enumerate, start, and delete registry keys and values, log keystrokes, return user names and passwords from protected storage, and rename, delete, copy, move, read, and write to files.	Backdoor.APT.PHOTO FE_APT_Photos_Metadata

TABLE 15. Malware used by APT41.

Malware	Description	Detected as
POISONPLUG	POISONPLUG is a highly obfuscated modular backdoor with plug-in capabilities. The malware is capable of registry or service persistence, self-removal, plug-in execution, and network connection forwarding. POISONPLUG has been observed using social platforms to host encoded C&C commands.	Backdoor.Win.POISONPLUG APT.Backdoor.Win.POISONPLUG
POISONPLUG.SHADOW	POISONPLUG.SHADOW is a modular backdoor with plugin capabilities. The first stage is shellcode, observed within compromised legitimate software. It connects to a C&C server for validation and configuration information to download the second stage. The second stage is a modular backdoor that can download plugins for additional functionality. POISONPLUG.SHADOW is assessed as an evolution of the POISONPLUG family.	FE_Backdoor_Win_POISONPLUG_1 FE_Backdoor_Win32_POISONPLUG_1 FE_Backdoor_Win_POISONPLUG_2
POTROAST	POTROAST is a backdoor that connects to a hard-coded C&C server. Its capabilities include downloading, uploading, and executing files and creating a reverse shell.	FE_APT_Backdoor_Win_POTROAST_1 APT.Backdoor.Win.POTROAST
ROCKBOOT	ROCKBOOT can access and write to the compromised system's hard disk drive beneath the operating system and file system to bypass the normal MBR boot sequence and execute malware prior to the host operating system being initialized. ROCKBOOT does not contain a malicious payload but relies on a secondary payload for malicious activities, which is specified at install time.	FE_APT_Backdoor_ROCKBOOT FE_Loader_Win_ROCKBOOT_1
SAGEHIRE	SAGEHIRE is a multistage implant that decodes each stage using shellcode and includes keylogging capabilities.	FE_APT_Sunshop_Dialog
SWEETCANDLE	SWEETCANDLE is a downloader that can download and execute a payload received from the C&C server.	FE_APT_Downloader_Win32_SWEETCANDLE_1 FE_APT_Downloader_Win32_SWEETCANDLE_2 APT.Downloader.Win.SWEETCANDLE
SOGU	SOGU is a backdoor that is capable of file upload and download, arbitrary process execution, filesystem and registry access, service configuration access, remote shell access, and implementing a custom VNC/RDP-like protocol to provide the C&C server with graphical access to the desktop.	Backdoor.APT.SOGU Backdoor.APT.Kaba Trojan.Plugx
TERA	TERA is a backdoor that uses legitimate services, such as Google Translate and Yahoo! Babel Fish, as proxies to download C&C configurations. It also uses a rootkit to mask network activity. After resolving the IP address of its C&C server, TERA will provide an input output control (IOCTL) code to its driver (rootkit component).	FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_TERA_1 FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_TERA_2 FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_TERA_3 FE_APT_Backdoor_Win64_TERA_1 FE_APT_Rootkit_Win64_TERA_1
TIDYELF	TIDYELF is a dropper for the WINTERLOVE backdoor. WINTERLOVE has been observed embedded within a resource within TIDYELF. TIDYELF will load the main WINTERLOVE component by injecting it into the iexplore.exe process. It will then create a registry key named HKLM\SOFTWARE\RAT to store configuration data for WINTERLOVE components to use.	FE_APT_Dropper_Win32_TIDYELF_1

TABLE 15. Malware used by APT41.

Malware	Description	Detected as
WIDETONE	WIDETONE is a command-line tool that can perform network-based reconnaissance tasks, including port scans, service banner scans, and pingscans. WIDETONE can brute-force credentials for SQL servers and Inter-Process Communication (IPC) shares. WIDETONE can also query Windows host information and perform dictionary and brute-force attacks.	FE_Trojan_Win_WIDETONE_1 FE_Trojan_Win32_WIDETONE_1
WINTERLOVE	WINTERLOVE is a backdoor used by suspected Chinese cyber espionage actors. WINTERLOVE attempts to load and execute remote code in a running process and can enumerate system files and directories.	FE_APT_Loader_Win32_WINTERLOVE_1 FE_APT_Keylogger_Win32_WINTERLOVE_1 FE_APT_Loader_Win32_WINTERLOVE_2 FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_WINTERLOVE_1 FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_WINTERLOVE_1
XDOOR	X-Door is a full-featured remote administration tool (RAT) with a configurable deployment and plug-in architecture. It is freely downloadable through a Chinese website, and the deployment interface and server use the Chinese language. X-Door contains functionality for keylogging, audio and video capture, file transfers, acting as a proxy, retrieving system information, providing a reverse command shell, injecting DLLs, and downloading and launching commands.	FE_APT_Backdoor_XDOOR Backdoor.APT.XDOOR
XMRIG	XMRIG is an open-source Monero cryptocurrency miner. It has variants for CPU, NVIDIA GPU, and AMD GPU mining.	FE_Trojan_Win_XMRMiner_1 FE_PUP_Win_XMRig_1
ZXSHELL	ZXSHELL is a backdoor that can be downloaded from the internet, particularly Chinese hacker websites. The backdoor can launch port scans, run a keylogger, capture screenshots, set up an HTTP or SOCKS proxy, launch a reverse command shell, cause SYN floods, and transfer/delete/run files. The publicly available version of the tool provides a graphical user interface that malicious actors can use to interact with victim backdoors. Simplified Chinese is the language used for the bundled ZXSHELL documentation.	Backdoor.APT.ZXShell FE_APT_Backdoor_ZXShell FE_APT_ZXSHELL_1 FE_APT_ZXSHELL_2 FE_APT_ZXSHELL_3 FE_APT_ZXSHELL_4 FE_APT_ZXSHELL_5 FE_APT_ZXSHELL_6 Backdoor.APT.ZXShell.SYSINFO_Command Backdoor.APT.ZXShell.GETCMD_Command Backdoor.APT.ZXShell.FILEMG_Command Backdoor.APT.ZXShell.TRANSFILE_Command, ZXSHELL RAT, Trojan.ZxShell Backdoor.APT.Viper FE_APT_VIPER

TECHNICAL ANNEX

APT41 IOCs

TABLE 16. CRACKSHOT

File MD5	File SHA1	File SHA256
04fb0ccf3ef309b1cd587f609ab0e81e	44260a1dfd92922a621124640015160e621f32d5	993d14d00b1463519fea78ca65d8529663f487cd76b67b3fd35440bcd7a8e31
0b2e07205245697a749e422238f9f785	dde82093decde6371eb852a5e9a1aa4acf3b56ba	049a2d4d54c511b16f8bc33dae670736bf938c3542f2342192ad877ab38a7b5d
272537bbd2a8e2a2c3938dc31f0d2461	a045939f53c5ad2c0f7368b082aa7b0bd7b116da	d00b3edc3fe688fa035f1b919ef6e8f451a9c2197ef83d9bac3fa3af5e752243
dd792f9185860e1464b4346254b2101b	a260dcf193e747cee49ae83568eea6c04bf93cb3	7096f1fdefa15065283a0b7928d1ab97923688c7974f98a33c94de214c675567
fcfab508663d9ce519b51f767e902806	8272c1f41f7c223316c0d78bd3bd5744e25c2e9f	c667c9b2b9741247a56fcf0deebb4dc52b9ab4c0da6d9cdaba5461a5e2c86e0c

TABLE 17. GEARSHIFT

File MD5	File SHA1	File SHA256
5b26f5c7c367d5e976aaba320965cc7f	c2fb50c9ef7ae776a42409bce8ef1be464654a4e	7e0c95fc64357f12e837112987333cdaf8c1208ef8c100649eba71f1ea90c1db
f8c89ccd8937f2b760e6706738210744	f3c222606f890573e6128fbeb389f37bd6f6bda3	4aa6970cac04ace4a930de67d4c18106cf4004ba66670cfcdaa77a4c4821a213

TABLE 18. HIGHNOON

File MD5	File SHA1	File SHA256
46a557bdce734a6794b228df0195474	41bac813ae07aef41436e8ad22d605f786f9e099	42d138d0938494fd64e1e919707e7201e6675b1122bf30ab51b1ae26adaec921
77c60e5d2d99c3f63f2aea1773ed4653	ad77a34627192abdf32daa9208fbde8b4ebfb25c	7566558469ede04efc665212b45786a730055770f6ea8f924d8c1e324cae8691
849ab91e93116ae420d2fe2136d24a87	3f1dee370a155dc2e8fb15e776821d7697583c75	7cd17fc948eb5fa398b8554fea036bdb3c0045880e03acbe532f4082c271e3c5

TABLE 19. HIGHNOON.BIN

File MD5	File SHA1	File SHA256
36711896cf6b7f599305b590f195aec	1036a7088b060250bb66b6de91f0c6ac462dc24c	490c3e4af829e85751a44d21b25de1781cfe4961afdef6bb5759d9451f530994
7d51ea0230d4692eedc2d5a4cd66d2d	5ee7c57dc84391f63eaa3824c53cc10eafc9e388	63e8ed9692810d562adb80f27bb1aeaf48849e468bf5fd157bc83ca83139b6d7
a0a96138b57ee24eed31b652ddf60d4e	03de2118aac6f20786043c7ef0324ef01dcf4265	79190925bd1c3fae65b0d11db40ac8e61fb9326ccfed9b7e09084b891089602d

TABLE 20. JUMPALL

File MD5	File SHA1	File SHA256
ba08b593250c3ca5c13f56e2ca97d85e	adde0644a572ed593e8b0566698d4e3de0feb8a	c51c5bbc6f59407286276ce07f0f7ea994e76216e0abe34cbf20f1b1cbd9446d

TABLE 21. POISONPLUG

File MD5	File SHA1	File SHA256
223e4cc4cf5ce049f300671697a17a01	1835c7751436cc199c55b42f34566d25fe6104ca	e65d39fa659f64a57ee13e8a638abd9031fa1486311d2782f32e979d5dee1ca5
37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea	32466d8d232d7b1801f456fe336615e6fa5e6ffb	2eea29d83f485897e2bac9501ef000cc266ffe10019d8c529555a3435ac4aabd
557ff68798c71652db8a85596a4bab72	971bb08196bba400b07cf213345f55ce0a6eedc8	5d971ed3947597fbb7e51d806647b37d64d9fe915b35c7c9eaf79a37b82dab90
830a09ff05eac9a5f42897ba5176a36a	2366d181a1697bcb4f368df397dd0533ab8b5d27	70c03ce5c80aca2d35a5555b0532eedede24d4cc6bdb32a2c8f7e630bba5f26e
b0877494d36fab1f9f4219c3defbfb19	4dc5fadece500ccd8cc49cfcf8a1b59baee3382a	3e6c4e97cc09d0432fbbbf3f3e424d4aa967d3073b6002305cd6573c47f0341f
c8403fabda4d036a55d0353520e765c9	d0429abec299ddfee7e1d9ccff1766afd4c0992b	9283703dfbc642dd70c8c7667528552690e998bcb3f3374273c0b5c90c0d1366
ff8d92dfbcda572ef97c142017eec658	6f065eea36e28403d4d518b8e24bb7a915b612c3	f4d57acde4bc546a10cd199c70cdad09f576fdfe66a36b08a00c19ff6ae19661
ffd0f34739c1568797891b9961111464	82072cb53416c89bfee95b239f9a90677a0848df	0055dfaccc952c99b1171ce431a02abfce5c6f8fb5dc39e4019b624a7d03bfc

TABLE 22. POISONPLUG.SHADOW

File MD5	File SHA1	File SHA256
72584d6b7dd10c82d9118567b548b2b1	f067443c2c4d99dc6577006a2f105e51af731659	faedf9fef6edac2f0565882112b2eae14e dda024239d3218a9fe9ac7e0b12db6
97363d50a279492fda14cbab53429e75	f1a181d29b38dfe60d8ea487e8ed0ef30f064763	462a02a8094e833fd456baf0a6d4e18 bb7dab1a9f74d5f163a8334921a4ffde8
a6c7db170bc7a4ee2cdb192247b59cd6	5a85d1e19e0414fc59e454ccbaef0a3c6bb41268	92cb362ae8d24c05f368d13036534fe01 4344994d46031a0a8636a7ca0b792c6

Phishing Payloads

TABLE 23. □□□□□□□□(MERS)□□□.7z

File MD5	File SHA1	File SHA256
5e87b09f9a3f1b728c9797560a38764b	67c957c268c1e56cc8eb34b02e5c09eae62680f5	354c174e583e968f0ecf86cc20d59ecd 6e0f9d21800428453b8db63f344f0f22

TABLE 24. Documents.7z

File MD5	File SHA1	File SHA256
8c6ccea2eea92deb6f7632f949293f0	b193ff40a98cd086f92893784d8896065faa3ee3	bae8f4f5fc959bff980d6a6d12797b0d 647e97cc811c5b9e827d0b985d87f68f

Domains

- agegamepay[.]com
- ageofwuxia[.]com
- ageofwuxia[.]info
- ageofwuxia[.]net
- ageofwuxia[.]org
- bugcheck.xigncodeservice[.]com
- byeserver[.]com
- dnsgoogle[.]com
- gamewushu[.]com
- gxxservice[.]com
- ibmupdate[.]com
- infestexe[.]com
- kasparsky[.]net
- linux-update[.]net
- macfee[.]ga
- micros0ff[.]com
- micros0tf[.]com
- notped[.]com
- operatingbox[.]com
- paniesx[.]com
- serverbye[.]com
- sexyjapan.ddns[.]info
- symanteclabs[.]com
- technicianetext[.]com
- win7update[.]net
- xigncodeservice[.]com

URLs

- [https://docs.google\[.\]com/document/d/1ICySd5ZNGj9Jz8pigZsuv8ciusYKq0Q0Rpe2E0zgmU](https://docs.google[.]com/document/d/1ICySd5ZNGj9Jz8pigZsuv8ciusYKq0Q0Rpe2E0zgmU)
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- injuriesa@gmail[.]com
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